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Justice Visualized: Courts and the 
Body Camera Revolution 
Mary D. Fan* 
What really happened? For centuries, courts have been magisterially 
blind, cloistered far away from the contested events that they adjudicate, 
relying primarily on testimony to get the story — or competing stories. 
Whether oral or written, this testimony is profoundly human, with all the 
passions, partisanship and imperfections of human perception. Now a 
revolution is coming. Across the nation, police departments are deploying 
body cameras. Analyzing body camera policies from police departments 
across the nation, the article reveals an unfolding future where much of 
the main staple events of criminal procedure law will be recorded. Much of 
the current focus is on how body cameras will impact policing and public 
opinion. Yet there is another important audience for body camera footage 
— the courts that forge constitutional criminal procedure, the primary 
conduct rules for police. This article explores what the coming power to 
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editing. 
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replay a wider array of police enforcement actions than ever before means 
for judicial review and criminal procedure law. 
The body camera revolution means an evidentiary revolution for courts, 
transforming the traditional reliance on reports and testimony and filling 
in gaps in a domain where defendants are often silent. The article proposes 
rules of judicial review to cultivate regular use of the audiovisual record in 
criminal procedure cases and discourage gaps and omissions due to 
selective recording. The article also offers rules of restraint against the 
seductive power of video to seem to depict the unmediated truth. Camera 
perspective can subtly shape judgments. Personal worldviews influence 
image interpretation. And there is often a difference between the legally 
relevant truth and the depiction captured on video. Care must be taken 
therefore to apply the proper perceptual yardsticks and reserve 
interpretive questions for the appropriate fact-finders. 
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When justice removes the blindfold, vision of injustice is 
actually possible. Just as the veil is an obfuscation, so is the 
blindfold. . . . [B]lindness is no romantic trait. 
— Imani Perry1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the half-century since the rights revolution created constitutional 
criminal procedure, courts have been the central referees adjudicating 
what is fair or foul play in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.”2 Unlike a referee on the field, however, courts must make the 
calls far removed in time and place from the actual hotly contested 
events.3 Magisterially blind and cloistered away, courts are frequently 
reliant on deeply divergent and partisan accounts.4 
Did Walter’s girlfriend Roxanne consent to a search of their home or 
did police coerce her into letting them in by threatening to take away 
her child if she did not?5 Did Andre interfere with the capture of a 
runaway suspect while screaming profanities, then push and try to 
 
 1 Imani Perry, Occupying the Universal, Embodying the Subject, 17 LAW & LIT. 97, 
116 (2005). 
 2 This game metaphor is oft-recurring in constitutional criminal procedure. E.g., 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 
524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 (1987); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). For a discussion of the role of courts in framing 
conduct rules for police, see Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2471-503 
(1996). For accounts of the genesis of constitutional criminal procedure in the 1960s 
civil rights revolution, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: 
The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156-60 (1998); Michael 
J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 50-
77 (2000); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 159-73 (1980); 
Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of 
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 438-46 (1980).  
 3 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1255 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (“We have repeatedly and recently warned appellate courts, ‘far removed 
from the scene,’ against second-guessing the judgments made by the police . . . .”); 
Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 475 (2012) (per curiam) (noting that appellate courts 
are “far removed from the scene” where officers operate). 
 4 Cf. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 91 (2011) 
(discussing the representation of justice as blindfolded); Perry, supra note 1, at 116. 
 5 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1143 n.5 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting conflicting accounts between police officers and the defendant’s 
battered girlfriend over whether she consented to a search or acquiesced when 
threatened with removal of her child).  
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fight an officer?6 Or was Andre actually a witness to police beating a 
suspect and arrested on the pretext that he smelled of weed when he 
tried to speak up?7 
Did E.E. undergo physical and mental abuse and sleep-deprivation 
for 36 hours, or was he “cool,” “calm, “collected,” and “normal” when 
he confessed to murder?8 And did he even confess or did police make 
up a confession when he refused to crack?9 
After being pulled over for having a broken taillight, did Walter try 
to grab the officer’s stun gun forcing the officer to shoot him?10 Or did 
the officer shoot Walter in the back eight times when he was running 
away?11 Did police discover — or plant — the murder victim Teresa’s 
car keys in Steven’s bedroom and Steven’s blood in the victim’s car?12 
Blind justice, or justice guided heavily by testimony in a system 
where one party is often silent and both sides wage fierce credibility 
wars, poses the risk of being incomplete justice.13 What if courts had 
the capacity to replay what happened? The event replay power is 
becoming a reality for a wider array of investigative activities than ever 
before as a wave of police departments around the country begin 
 
 6 See Jones v. United States, 16 A.3d 966, 968-69 (D.C. 2011). 
 7 See id. at 968. 
 8 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 151-52 (1944) (noting sharply 
divergent accounts between the defendant and the police). 
 9 See id. at 150 (noting the defendant’s claim that he did not confess). 
 10 See Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, Residents Trace Police Shooting to a Crime 
Strategy Gone Awry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2015, at A1; Mark Berman, S.C. Investigators Say 




 11 Matt Apuzzo & Timothy Williams, Citizen’s Videos Raise Questions on Police 
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A1. 
 12 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Wisconsin v. Avery, No. 2010AP411-CR 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 25, 2010), 2010 WL 2691415 (recounting the defense theory that 
the police planted the evidence); Making a Murderer (Netflix 2015) (suggesting the 
police planted the evidence); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sparks, 746 N.E.2d 133, 
138 (Mass. 2001) (alleging that police planted evidence found in his living quarters); 
Reed v. State, No. 62117, 2013 WL 3256317, at *1 (Nev. June 12, 2013) (discussing 
the defendant’s argument that his defense counsel was deficient for not contending the 
search of his car was non-consensual and that the police planted the evidence); People 
v. McGirt, 603 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (App. Div. 1993) (discussing defendant’s claim that 
that the police “hassle” him every day and that on the day of his arrest, they planted 
evidence on him after using a ruse to get him out of his parents’ apartment to search 
him”); State v. Pogue, 17 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing the 
defendant’s claim that the police planted the drug evidence during a vehicle search).  
 13 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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deploying police-worn body cameras.14 Small enough to be worn on 
the head, ear, or chest, a body camera can go everywhere officers go, 
providing audiovisual recording of what officers see, hear and do.15 
Spurred by the turmoil around the nation over policing practices, a 
police body camera revolution is fast unfolding, with numerous 
departments announcing body camera programs in 2015.16 Many 
major police departments are planning to start or expand body camera 
programs throughout their forces in 2016.17 There are important open 
policy questions and different approaches surrounding body cameras, 
including what officers will be required to record, or not record, and 
the discretionary model in each jurisdiction.18 
Based on an analysis of the available body camera policies from 
police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the nation, this 
article envisions a future where police officers will be able to record 
many of the most contested events in criminal procedure.19 While 
 
 14 See infra Part II.B and Table 1 (presenting results of research on plans to deploy 
body cameras in the 100 largest cities in the United States).  
 15 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, A PRIMER ON BODY-
WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (2012), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-
Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf (discussing size, wearability and audiovisual capacity of 
body-worn cameras); S.F. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS POLICY, RECOMMENDED 
DRAFT 1 (2015) (defining a body-worn cameras as “a small audio-video recorder with 
the singular purpose of recording audio/visual files, specifically designed to be 
mounted on a person”). 
 16 See infra Part I.B for a discussion; see also, e.g., Max Ehrenfreund, Body Cameras 
for Cops Could Be the Biggest Change to Come out of the Ferguson Protests, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/02/body-
cameras-for-cops-could-be-the-biggest-change-to-come-out-of-the-ferguson-protests/ 
(discussing rapidly spreading movement to adopt body cameras); Josh Sanburn, The 
One Battle Michael Brown’s Family Will Win, TIME (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://time.com/3606376/police-cameras-ferguson-evidence (discussing the building 
movement toward body cameras). 
 17 See infra Part II.B and Table 1 for a discussion.  
 18 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1794, 1805-14 (2015) (noting numerous important open questions about body 
cameras that remain to be answered). 
 19 See infra Part II; see also, e.g., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14 § V.E. 
(Dec. 30, 2015) (effective Jan. 1, 2016) (on file with author) (requiring recording of 
routine calls for service, investigatory stops, foot pursuits, search warrant execution, 
and “any other instance when enforcing the law,” as well as traffic stops, vehicle 
pursuits and emergency driving situations); D.C. METRO. POLICE, GEN. ORDER 302, NO. 
13, at 6-8 (June 29, 2015) (on file with author) (requiring officers to initiate body-
worn cameras when responding to calls for service, “at the beginning of any self-
initiated police action,” “[a]ll contacts initiated pursuant to a law enforcement 
investigation, whether criminal or civil,” all stops, all pursuits, use of force situations, 
arrests, searches, prisoner transports and an array of other enforcement activities); 
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body camera policies tend to differ widely on privacy and victim 
protection shut-off provisions, there is greater convergence regarding 
enforcement activities that officers must record.20 Numerous policies 
provide that, at a minimum, police officers will now record stops, 
searches, responses to calls for service, pursuits, uses of force, arrests, 
and transportation of arrestees.21 This article explores what the 
capacity to replay body camera footage of a wider array of police 
enforcement actions than ever before means for judicial review and 
criminal procedure law. 
The body camera revolution poses a major paradigm shift for courts 
in criminal cases for three reasons: comprehensiveness, detail and 
volume. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, courts have access 
to recordings of police interrogations.22 Patrol vehicle dash cameras 
can also yield relevant footage, albeit sometimes at an awkward 
distance or angle.23 But body-worn video will cover a much wider 
 
Intradepartmental Correspondence from the Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t, to the 
Honorable Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. Police Dep’t 2 (Apr. 23, 2015) (on file 
with author) (requiring activation of body-worn video equipment during calls for 
service, pedestrian stops, “officer-initiated consensual encounters,” foot pursuits, 
searches, arrests, uses of force, in-custody transports, victim and witness interviews, 
and crowd management, as well as vehicle stops); N.Y. POLICE DEPT., OPERATIONS 
ORDER NO. 48 2 (Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with author) (providing that officers 
participating in the body-worn camera pilot program shall activate the cameras during 
stops and frisks, enforcement encounters involving violations or petty offenses, 
attempts to take persons into custody, “[a]ny public interaction regardless of context, 
that escalates and becomes adversarial,” uses of force, “[a]ll interior vertical patrols of 
non-Housing Authority buildings and Housing Authority buildings, as well as vehicle 
stops); PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21 § 4A (Apr. 20, 2015) (on file with author) 
(requiring recording during any pedestrian investigation, when initiating an arrest or 
citation, or handling a disturbance or crisis, at any protest or demonstration and 
“[w]hen confronted by any member of the general public that is or may become 
confrontational, antagonistic or hostile”). 
 20 See infra Part II (reporting findings of convergence around activities required to 
be recorded). For a discussion of the privacy and public disclosure balances being 
struck, see Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, and Police Body Cameras: The 
National Policy Split, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016) [hereinafter Police Body Cameras]. 
 21 See infra Part II.A and Table 2. 
 22 See G. Daniel Lassiter, Patrick J. Munhall, Andrew L. Geers, Paul E. Weiland & 
Ian M. Handley, Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped 
Confessions, 1 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 53, 54 (2001) [hereinafter Camera 
Perspective Bias] (noting estimates that more than half of law enforcement agencies 
videotape some interrogations).  
 23 See, e.g., Lard v. State, 431 S.W.3d 249, 255, 264-65 (Ark. 2014) (holding that 
the trial court did not err in allowing the government to play dash camera footage of 
the defendant killing a police officer in a capital case); Commonwealth v. Favinger, 
No. 1678 MDA 2013, 2014 WL 10987112, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (noting that the 
trial court adjudicating the suppression motion reviewed the dash camera video to 
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array of police enforcement activities than interrogations or 
encounters that happen near a police vehicle.24 Body-worn cameras 
can go to places police cars cannot, such as porches, homes, on foot 
patrol, while executing warrants, and more.25 
Body cameras record events closer up, yielding more detail than ever 
before captured by testimony or a dash camera.26 Compare, for 
instance the two stills below from video of police responding to a call 
about a man at the side of the road armed with a knife who had 
stabbed himself in the stomach.27 The still on the left is from the dash 
 
determine whether there was probable cause to stop the defendant for not driving in 
his lane but “it was very difficult to see from the video the distance” the defendant was 
traveling over the line and therefore the court relied on testimony). 
 24 See infra Part II.B and supra note 19; see also, e.g., ATLANTA POLICE DEP’T, 
ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY MANUAL, SPECIAL ORDER APD.SO.14.05, at 2-3 
(2014) (on file with author) (requiring recording of pedestrian stops, field interviews, 
foot pursuits, search warrant executions, victim and witness interviews as well as 
traffic-related law enforcement activities); AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, AUSTIN POLICE 
DEPARTMENT POLICY MANUAL, POLICY 303, at 125-26 (2015) (on file with author) 
(requiring recording of warrant service, investigatory stops, and “any contact that 
becomes adversarial in an incident that would not otherwise require recording” as 
well as traffic stops); HOUSTON POLICE DEP’T, DRAFT GEN. ORDER 400-28 5-6 (2015) (on 
file with author) (requiring body-worn camera activation when “[a]rriving on scene to 
any call for service, . . . [s]elf-initiating a law enforcement activity,” initiating a stop, 
conducting searches, during transportation after arrest, while interviewing witnesses 
and complainants as well as during vehicular stops and pursuits); S.F. POLICE DEP’T, 
supra note 15, at 2-3 (2015) (on file with author) (requiring recording of detention 
and arrests, “consensual encounters,” pedestrian stops, foot pursuits, service of search 
or arrest warrants, consent-based as well as suspicion-based searches, transportation 
of arrestees and detainees, and “[d]uring any citizen encounter that becomes hostile” 
as well as vehicle pursuits and traffic stops). 
 25 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 5-6 (discussing small size, 
portability and wearability of body-worn cameras); see also supra notes 19–24 
(offering examples of where officers must activate their body-worn cameras). 
 26 See, e.g., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 19, § V.E. (requiring recording of the 
entire incident); OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER I-15.1, 
PORTABLE VIDEO MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 3-4 (July 16, 2015) (requiring body camera 
activation prior to a long list of enforcement activities and continued recording until 
the conclusion of the event unless privacy exceptions apply); Intradepartmental 
Correspondence from the Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t, to the Honorable Board of 
Police Commissioners, L.A. Police Dep’t, supra note 19, at 2 (requiring recording of 
the entire contact); see also, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 6 (describing 
body-worn camera resolution specifications and mounting considerations to capture 
data). 
 27 The videos are available at Raw Leak, Police Release Videos of Fatal Shooting, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-iWN7UfoJQ. 
Pursuant to a records request, the New Hampshire Attorney General released four 
videos of the shooting: one from a vehicle equipped with a dash camera and three 
body-worn camera videos. Mike Cronin, Dashboard Video Shows Fatal Shooting of Man 
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camera. The still on the right is from the body-worn video of one of 
the officers involved. 
 
View from patrol vehicle 
dash camera 
View from officer-worn 
body camera 
 
The much greater comprehensiveness of coverage exponentially 
expands the volume of video relevant to search and seizure 
suppression issues that courts and litigants will be able to access as a 
routine matter.28 With rapidly spreading uptake, body cameras have 
the potential to be disruptive technology in the sense of having the 
transformative power to shake up old ways of analyzing criminal 
procedure cases.29 Events previously reconstructed primarily by 
testimony readily reducible to text for appellate review will now be 
captured on video that offers trial and appellate judges the opportunity 
 
Who Ran at Police, WMUR9 ABC, http://www.wmur.com/news/dashboard-video-
shows-fatal-shooting-of-man-who-ran-at-police/35488864 (last updated Sept. 25, 
2015, 11:55 PM). 
 28 See, e.g., Josh Sanburn, Storing Body Cam Data Is the Next Big Challenge for 
Police, TIME (Jan. 25, 2016), http://time.com/4180889/police-body-cameras-vievu-
taser/ (reporting estimate that big-city police departments are generating more than 
10,000 hours of video a week). 
 29 See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 7-28 (3d ed. 2003) 
(discussing the concept of disruptive technology in the private sector); Tom Casady, 
Hidden Cost of Body Cameras, DIRECTOR’S DESK (Oct. 31, 2014, 6:12 AM), 
http://lpd304.blogspot.com/2014/10/hidden-cost-of-body-worn-cameras.html (“In 
some ways, [body-worn video] is a disruptive technology: a game-changer that leap 
frogs vehicle-mounted systems.”). 
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— and temptation — to see and decide for themselves what 
happened.30 
When the Supreme Court decided the fate of a civil suit against 
police based on police vehicle dash camera footage, scholars expressed 
concern.31 In Scott v. Harris, the Court ruled that no reasonable juror 
could agree with the plaintiff’s account that the police used excessive 
force in the car chase and granted summary judgment for the 
government.32 Scholars wrote that the Court was overstepping the role 
of an appellate court and depriving jurors of a chance to decide.33 
Neither Scott v. Harris nor the debate over it has explored the larger 
question of how trial and appellate courts should exercise the event 
replay power in the much more frequent context of deciding search 
and seizure suppression motions where judges rather than juries find 
the facts and forge the bulk of criminal procedure law.34 
An examination of the implications of body camera footage for 
judicial review and criminal procedure law is needed as potentially 
millions of hours of video evidence covering events previously 
relegated to competing witness accounts becomes available to courts 
and litigants.35 This article fills that gap, exploring the implications of 
the event replay power that body-worn cameras will give courts. 
 
 30 Cf. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 534 
(1992) (“The model of contemporary law remains largely print-based.”). 
 31 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling 
Take on Excessive-Force Claims, 43 TRIAL 74, 76 (2007) (“[I]t is deeply troubling when 
an appellate court, acting on its own, watches a tape and decides the facts of a case for 
itself.”); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and 
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841-42 (2009) (arguing the 
Court was wrong to privilege its own view of the video and deny jurors the 
opportunity to interpret it based on their worldviews). 
 32 Scott, 550 U.S. at 386. 
 33 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 76; Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 841-42. 
 34 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question 
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”); 
United States v. Simpson, 992 F.2d 1224, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing fact-
finding by judge at suppression hearing); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 
(9th Cir. 1981) (discussing standards of review for factual findings by the trial judge 
at a suppression hearing). 
 35 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 74 (predicting that judicial decision-
making that entails reviewing videotape of the contested incident “is likely to become 
a trend” and “raises serious questions about what is appropriate evidence for appeals 
courts to consider”); Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The 
Constitutionality and Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2012) (“Technological advances that can put 
appellate judges in shoes that very much resemble those of jurors and trial judges raise 
questions about whether appellate courts should defer to judges and juries as they 
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Part I discusses the problems with the primacy of orality and text in 
the criminal procedure context, where part of the story is often 
missing because of the formidable reasons for defendants to remain 
silent. This part also discusses the growing evidence of the frailties of 
human perception and the fierce intractable credibility contests that 
ensue when defendants contest the government’s account. This part 
discusses how body cameras are disruptive technology with the 
potential to transform this tradition. 
Part II presents findings from a study of the body camera practices 
and recording policies among police departments serving the largest 
100 cities in America to show what is in store for courts and litigants. 
The findings show the prevalence of a limited discretion model 
whereby police are required to record the law enforcement encounters 
that are central to the daily work of courts adjudicating criminal 
procedure questions. This means that the body camera revolution will 
also be an evidentiary revolution for courts. 
Part III argues that in deciding search and seizure suppression 
matters, where criminal procedure law is primarily forged and applied, 
trial and appellate courts should regularly consult the audiovisual as 
well as textual record. To discourage selective recording and non-
recording, courts should also inquire into why video footage that 
should be present under departmental policy is missing. Body-worn 
video can give courts a better vantage about what happens on the 
ground to more accurately judge what counts as fair or foul play. 
Body-worn video is a particularly important source of information in a 
system where the defendant often has strong disincentives to testify 
and may stay silent rather than risk taking the stand in a suppression 
hearing or trial.36 This part also addresses conflicting positions taken 
by appellate courts over whether to review videos admitted below and 
confusion over the proper role of appellate courts when it comes to 
the audiovisual record. 
While the ability to clarify opaque areas of the law and get a fuller 
sense of what happened can be beneficial, there is a need for 
audiovisual literacy and rules of restraint. Part III discusses the myth 
of camera objectivity and presents scientific evidence and cinematic 
 
traditionally have done . . . .”). 
 36 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1449-50, 1458 (2005) (“The United States’s criminal justice 
system is shaped by a fundamental absence: Criminal defendants rarely speak. From 
the first Miranda warnings through trial until sentencing, defendants are constantly 
encouraged to be quiet . . . . No government actor is permitted to obtain information 
from them, and they are largely expected to remain silent in court as well.”). 
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theory on subtle persuasion effects in camera perspective. This Part 
also argues for judicial restraint and caution in indulging the ability to 
see and decide for oneself in two important contexts. The first is on 
factual questions properly reserved for a jury, such as matters that go 
to guilt, innocence or liability. The second is on criminal procedure 
questions where the relevant truth is what actors perceived and 
believed at the time, not what a camera’s angle — free of stress and 
fear and viewed coolly in hindsight — can catch. 
I. THE CAMERA CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
I wouldn’t know what to say to officers who didn’t think they 
were on camera all the time, everywhere. At this point, you 
would just look at them and you say, “Seriously?” And then 
maybe sit them in a room for a day and have them read the 
newspaper. I think there is a general understanding that 
cameras are everywhere all the time.37 
Small portable cameras are everywhere, part of the cell phones that 
people wear like bodily appendages.38 In the United States, 91% of 
adults have cell phones.39 And not just any old clunky cell phone — 
56% of adults have smartphones.40 More than any time in human 
history, people live their lives under a camera’s eye — in selfies, in 
home-made video clips, caught on someone else’s camera.41 Every day 
on average in 2014, people uploaded 1.8 billion digital images — a 
total of 657 billion photos a year.42 
Steve Mann famously termed the small cameras affixed to small 
entities such as individuals and ubiquitously deployed today 
 
 37 Interview with Lt. Joel Guay, Seattle Police Dep’t (Jan. 25, 2016) (video of 
interview on file with author). 
 38 See generally Aaron Smith, The Best (and Worst) of Mobile Connectivity, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/30/the-best-and-worst-of-
mobile-connectivity/. 
 39 Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 
2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-
91-of-adults/. 
 40 Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership — 2013 Update, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership-2013/. 
 41 Rose Eveleth, How Many Photographs of You Are Out There in the World?, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/ 
how-many-photographs-of-you-are-out-there-in-the-world/413389/; see also NEAL 
FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 14 (2009). 
 42 Eveleth, supra note 41. 
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“sousveillance devices.”43 The term sousveillance captures the shift in 
power relations between the persons conducting the observation or 
recording and the subject, as well as the re-positioning of the cameras 
so that it is not necessarily hovering from a building or other entity 
above.44 The entity doing the recording or observing is no longer in a 
superior position of power over the subject — citizens exercise 
bottom-up control when recording the police to monitor the 
watchmen.45 
Going further than the sousveillance imagery, I suggest that our 
modern condition is one of toutveillance. Toutveillance is not the top-
down of surveillance, nor the bottom-up of sousveillance, but a 
modern condition where everyone has incentive to record to contest 
or control the narrative. Any ordinary Chris,46 Feidin,47 or Ramsey48 
can record the police and release a viral video shot from his point of 
view. Police departments in turn have incentive to deploy body 
cameras to offer a competing visual depiction shot from their 
perspective.49 In a toutveillance society — where everybody is 
watching everybody, taking photos, and recording video — perhaps 
what is more remarkable is that so many enforcement encounters still 
have to be reconstructed in court through testimony and reports 
without event replay.50 
 
 43 Steve Mann, Veillance and Reciprocal Transparency: Surveillance Versus 
Sousveilance, AR Glass, Lifeglogging, and Wearable Computing, 2013 PROC. IEEE INT’L 
SYMP. ON TECH. & SOC’Y 1, 1. 
 44 Id. at 3-4. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Air Reserve Base worker Chris LeDay played an important role in disseminating 
the video of the shooting of Alton Sterling to the public. Peter Holley, ‘Super-Fishy’: 
Man Who Posted Video of Alton Sterling Killing Claims Employer Still Refusing to Let Him 
Work, WASH. POST (July 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2016/07/13/man-who-posted-video-of-alton-sterling-killing-claims-he-was-
targeted-by-vengeful-police/?utm_term=.2c4e3f596bee. 
 47 Immigrant barber Feidin Santana recorded the shooting of Walter Scott in 
South Carolina. Feidin Santana, Who Recorded Police Shooting of Walter Scott, Speaks 
Out, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/feidin-santana-
who-recorded-man-shot-police-officer-speaks-out-n338171. 
 48 Deli worker Ramsey Orta filmed the death of Eric Garner. J. David Goodman, 
Man Who Filmed Fatal Police Chokehold Is Arrested on Weapons Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2014, at A19. 
 49 See, e.g., POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., ENHANCING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH 
AN EFFECTIVE ON-BODY CAMERA PROGRAM FOR MPD OFFICERS 3-4 (2014) (discussing 
hopes that body cameras will offer more accurate evidence); Editorial, Dueling 
Cameras, BALT. SUN, Nov. 13, 2006, at 10A (discussing issues with competitive and 
selective filming). 
 50 Cf. Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, The Generalized Sousveillance Society, 49 SOC. SCI. 
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This part begins by discussing the challenges of establishing what 
actually happened in adjudicating criminal procedure questions in a 
system where testimony and text reign supreme. Defendants face 
dilemmas about whether to remain silent or offer their side of the 
story. When the questions are contested, ugly credibility contests can 
ensue, where the defendant and the police are accused of malfeasance 
and lying. Especially in criminal cases, where the human stakes are 
high, the reliability of testimony and the partisan nature of human 
perception are under fire. We then turn to the recent convergence in 
interests of an array of unlikely bedfellows to spread the use of body 
cameras across the nation, ushering in a new era of evidence in 
criminal procedure cases. 
A. The Problems with the Primacy of Testimony and Text 
The case sounds like any of the legions of drug possession cases 
commonplace in the courts and criminal procedure canon.51 The basis 
for the arrest was possession of a controlled substance.52 Officers 
initially stopped Kenneth Simmons for riding a bicycle in the park at 
night without his lights on.53 When the officers approached him, 
Simmons pedaled his bike rapidly away and did not stop when 
ordered to do so.54 The police report states that when officers 
apprehended him, Simmons rolled around, flopped his legs, tried to 
kick officers, and pulled out a knife, which officers removed.55 
Regarding the search that ultimately yielded the contraband, the 
report stated: 
 
INFO. 489, 489 (2010) (theorizing sousveillance as “the present state of modern 
technological societies where anybody may take photos or videos of any person or 
event, and then diffuse the information freely all over the world”). 
 51 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 38-43 (1992) (discussing the main staple cases in a 
criminal court); Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the 
Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 439, 448-49 (1999) (discussing the cyclical nature of addiction and criminal 
prosecution and the large judicial workload due to drug and alcohol abuse-related 
cases). 
 52 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350(a) (2016) (prohibiting possession of a 
controlled substance). 
 53 San Diego Reg’l Officer’s Report Narrative, Incident No. 14050033181, from 
Officer Robles and Officer Williams (May 17, 2014) [hereinafter Simmons Police 
Report] (on file with author). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 3-4. 
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I saw Simmons grabbing towards his right pants pocket. We 
were able to gain control of Simmons. I grabbed Simmons [sic] 
right hand and started to search Simmons. When I would 
search his right pocket he would try rolling over so I could not 
search him. I was able to search his picket and did not find any 
controlled substances or weapons. I search [sic] Simmons 
right coin pocket and discovered a clear plastic baggy with a 
rock like substance that I recognized as a controlled 
substance.56 
At the preliminary hearing, the officers involved similarly testified as 
to the chase, the struggle, and the discovery of the drugs in the 
suspect’s pocket.57 
Now view and listen to the body camera video.58 Because a video 
cannot be reproduced in text, stills from the video are offered below. 
Like all the other stills from body camera footage presented in this 
article, the images are in the public domain, released to the public 




 56 Id. at 4. 
 57 Preliminary Hearing and Arraignment Transcript at 6-10, People v. Simmons, 
No. SCD-256148 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2014). 
 58 Allison Ash, Raw Video from SDPD Officer’s Body Camera Shows Man’s Arrest at 
Park, YOUTUBE (Jun. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Simmons Body Camera Video], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OvbgZFQYG18 (containing footage originally 
shown on ABC10 News). The video first shows officers pulling Simmons off his bike 
and arresting him. The search begins at 2:35 in the video. 
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During much of the search, Simmons’s pants are pulled down and 
his buttocks are exposed.59 As multiple officers involved in the search 
lift, turn and search him, he is crying out, panting, and voicing fear.60 
There are indications that he may have defecated in fear.61 Most of the 
search footage is focused on Simmons’s buttocks and groin region, 
indicating the area of focus by the officer wearing the camera, but later 
we finally see Simmons’ face, swollen and bloody.62 
The summary in the report does not capture the full experience of 
the search shown in the video — nor even what two stills from the 
video can convey. The contrast between video, testimony, and report 
dramatically captures how the camera can reveal far more than 
testimony or reports. Even a factually accurate summary of events 
from the officer’s perception may leave out important facts.63 Yet 
judges decide most criminal procedure cases based on testimony or 
declarations — including hearsay testimony from persons without 
personal knowledge of the events relying on police reports.64 At 
suppression hearings to determine the admissibility of evidence, the 
rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials do not apply.65 There are 
at least three major troubles with the reliance on testimony and 
reports in criminal procedure cases: (1) the frequent silence of one 
side, (2) the growing evidence of the partiality and fallibility of 
perceptions, and (3) ugly credibility contests in which neither the 
defendant nor the police emerge unscathed. 
 
 59 Id. at 2:58–6:36. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. at 4:38–4:55; see also Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand 
for Jury Trial at 7, Simmons v. San Diego, Case No. 30-2015-00803397-CU-PO-CJC 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Simmons v. San Diego, Second Amended 
Complaint] (alleging he partially defecated in fear). 
 62 Simmons Body Camera Video, supra note 58, at 7:19–7:30. 
 63 In the Simmons case, there is a pending lawsuit over whether the report and 
testimony by the officers accurately captured the events. See Second Amended 
Complaint, supra note 61, at 7-8. This article does not take a stand on the accuracy of 
the testimony or reports but simply points out that even assuming the reports and 
testimony are accurate from the officer’s perception, many important details are lost in 
the reconstruction by reports and testimony. 
 64 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that a court deciding preliminary 
questions such as the admissibility of evidence “is not bound by evidence rules, except 
those on privilege”); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1974) 
(explaining that hearsay is admissible at hearings to determine the admissibility of 
evidence).  
 65 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  
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1. Defendant Silence 
When reading constitutional criminal procedure cases, one 
sometimes marvels at the facts — and the information gaps between 
the facts. How did Michael Whren just happen to be holding two large 
plastic bags of cocaine boldly in plain view when the police officers he 
saw tailing him pulled him over and walked up to his car?66 When 
Officer Lang asked Christopher Drayton “Mind if I check you?” after 
arresting Drayton’s travel companion and Drayton lifted his hands 
eight inches from his legs, was that really an expression of consent or 
submission to authority?67 It seems that one part of the story — one 
whole side of the story — is missing.68 Why? 
One major reason for the seeming one-sidedness of the facts in 
many criminal procedure cases is that the other key party to the event 
— the defendant — has several formidable reasons to stay silent. A 
defendant who takes the stand loses the shelter of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and may be cross-
examined by the prosecution on issues reasonably related to his direct 
testimony.69 A decision by the defendant to testify is thus also a 
 
 66 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996). 
 67 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199 (2002). 
 68 From the filings, it appears that the testifying persons at the suppression 
hearings were all government agents, not the defendants. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, 
Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996 WL 75758, at *3-4 (discussing the lineup of 
witnesses at the suppression hearing); Brief for Appellant at 6-8, Brown v. United 
States, 231 F.3d 787 (2000) (No. 99-15152-I), 1999 WL 33616942, at *6-8; see also, 
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Song Remains the Same: The Story of Whren v. United 
States, in RACE LAW STORIES 419, 428-29 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado 
eds., 2008) (discussing the suppression hearing generally). Scholars have also 
suggested the officers’ side of the story in Whren is improbable and needs greater 
scrutiny and adversarial examination. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 384 (1998) (discussing concern over police perjury 
in a case like Whren); I. Bennet Capers, The Fourth Problem, 49 TULSA L. REV. 431, 435 
n.34 (2013) (book review) [hereinafter Fourth Problem] (discussing “the improbability 
of the officers’ version of the events and the likelihood that they in fact engaged in 
‘testilying’” in Whren and noting that “both officers have been the subject of 
misconduct allegations, including allegations of planting evidence and providing false 
testimony”). 
 69 See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) (“It has long been 
held that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the 
privilege against cross-examination on matters reasonably related to the subject matter 
of his direct examination. It is not thought overly harsh in such situations to require 
that the determination whether to waive the privilege take into account the matters 
which may be brought out on cross-examination.” (citations omitted)); Rogers v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (“[I]f the witness himself elects to waive his 
privilege, as he may doubtless do, since the privilege is for his protection and not for 
  
914 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:897 
decision to “waive his privilege completely” and “having once cast 
aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever 
cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing.”70 
Deciding to speak and becoming subject to cross-examination can 
be more than just inconvenient or embarrassing for a defendant — it 
can destroy his case and credibility. A testifying defendant faces the 
risk of impeachment by reference to his prior convictions.71 The 
testifying defendant also incurs the risk of impeachment by evidence 
suppressed because of a search or seizure in violation of the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.72 Defendant testimony at a 
suppression hearing also presents special challenges because 
prosecutors can use inconsistencies in testimony at the suppression 
hearing to impeach him if he testifies at trial, though suppression 
hearing testimony cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt at 
trial.73 
If a defendant stays silent, the prosecution may not suggest that 
adverse inferences be drawn from that silence.74 Indeed a defendant is 
entitled to a jury instruction that no adverse inferences may be drawn 
from silence.75 But if the defendant chooses to testify, “his failure to 
deny or explain evidence of incriminating circumstances of which he 
may have knowledge may be the basis of adverse inference, and the 
jury may be so instructed.”76 
 
that of other parties, and discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to 
stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure.” (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 
591, 597 (1896))). 
 70 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 419 (1957). 
 71 See, e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759 (2000) (“It is also generally 
recognized that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached 
by proof of prior convictions or the like . . . .” (quoting McGautha, 402 U.S. at 215)). 
 72 See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980). 
 73 Compare Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (“[W]e find it 
intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to 
assert another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a 
motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not 
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no 
objection.”), with People v. Douglas, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) 
(“We conclude that defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing may be used for 
impeachment purposes if he takes the stand at his trial and testifies in a manner 
inconsistent with his pretrial testimony.”), and People v. Mahone, 614 N.Y.S.2d 409, 
411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“It was not improper for the prosecutor to use 
inconsistencies between defendant’s testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial 
to impeach him.”). 
 74 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
 75 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981). 
 76 Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 494 (1926). 
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A defendant who wants to tell his side of the story must weigh the 
benefits against the substantial potential costs of taking the stand.77 
The balance of costs and benefits is such that lawyers often advise 
defendants to not take the stand and remain silent.78 Thus, defendant 
silence is prevalent throughout the criminal process, including at 
hearings to contest the admissibility of evidence based on claims of 
wrongful search or seizure.79 This typically means that judges 
dependent on traditional testimony hear one side of the story more 
prominently than the other. 
Sometimes snippets of the defendant’s voice emerge, memorialized 
as evidence by the government.80 For example, the police report in 
Simmons’ case stated that Simmons told officers: “I did not know you 
were the police. I had my headphones in. I never looked back. I could 
not hear you yelling at me. I knew that I had rocks on me. I only knew 
that you were the police when we were fighting.”81 What the police 
report states is important because it is what prosecutors, defense 
attorneys and officers consult to understand or recall a case from 
myriad others.82 When you view the body camera video you hear that 
Simmons said a lot more about the search and seizure.83 But what is 
 
 77 See, e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759-60 (2000) (“[I]t is not 
thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require 
the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify.”). 
 78 Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1458. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See, e.g., People v. Austin, No. 112721-U, 2013 WL 2302080, at * 3 (Ill. App. 
Ct. May 24, 2013) (noting that while the defendant’s statements to the officer were 
not taped, videorecorded or memorialized in report the “substance of the interview” 
was included in the police report); State v. Ingram, 774 S.E.2d 433, 437 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2015) (reporting that the defendant’s statements while in the hospital after he 
shot at officers and officers shot him were recorded in the police report); Sambolin v. 
State, 387 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tenn. 1965) (noting that the defendants’ oral admissions 
were made a part of the police report and discussing the admissibility of the 
statements against the defendants). 
 81 Simmons Police Report, supra note 53, at 5. 
 82 Consider this compelling account:  
And for the defender, the flow of cases is endless; a limitless stream of files. 
A dozen or so clean, raw files appear on their desks in the morning, at most 
containing a police report and the defendant’s application for indigent 
defense. Into court they come, stack of files in hand, yelling to determine if 
their clients have even shown up. ‘Is there a Mr. Firmen here? Is Ms. Nonce 
in court?’ 
John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1240-41 
(1994) [hereinafter Redefining]. 
 83 Simmons Body Camera Video, supra note 58, at 2:35–6:36. 
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memorialized is what has evidentiary value in the government’s case.84 
Thus, without cameras, even when the defendant’s voice is heard, it is 
filtered through reports as potential evidence. 
2. The Partiality and Fallibility of Perception 
A second challenge of dependence on testimony and police reports 
is that it relies on memory, often under stress.85 A large body of 
important work has illuminated how our memory is not as 
trustworthy a record as we believe, even when we are trying earnestly 
to tell the truth.86 While much of the evidence is in the context of the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification, the insights about memory apply 
to other testimonial contexts.87 Despite the common perception that 
we are better at remembering situations “burned into our memory” 
because they occurred in high-stress situations, the scientific evidence 
indicates that high stress actually negatively impacts memory.88 When 
 
 84 See Simmons Police Report, supra note 53, at 5. 
 85 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Often 
enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the 
moment”); see also, e.g., WOODLAND POLICE DEP’T, GEN. ORDER. 4.09.03 (2009), 
http://www.cityofwoodland.org/gov/depts/police/secure/order%20manual.pdf (“The 
arresting officer is responsible for the completion and submission for approval of all 
arrest reports before the end of his/her shift.”); Terry A. Beehr et al., Working in a 
Violent Environment: The Accuracy of Police Officers’ Reports About Shooting Incidents, 
77 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 217, 230, 232 (2004) (discussing the 
impact of stress on event recall by officers and the implications for police reports and 
testimony). 
 86 See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE 
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 68 (1995) (reporting that more than 2,000 
studies have been performed illuminating the problems with memory, perception and 
eyewitness identification); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 52-133 (1996) 
(discussing seminal studies and memory processes); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Make-Believe 
Memories, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 867, 868-71 (2003) (reviewing findings on faulty 
eyewitness memory). 
 87 Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Eyewitness Testimony, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 442-43 
(1981) (book review) (discussing insights from eyewitness memory studies for other 
evidentiary contexts). 
 88 See, e.g., LOFTUS, supra note 86, at 33; Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-
Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 687, 699 (2004); Charles A. Morgan, III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory 
for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 265, 265-67 (2004); Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken?: Testing 
Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 179 (2006); see 
also, e.g., JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF 
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 15-20 (2010) (describing attempt to memorize every detail 
of assailant and certitude of identification that proved wrong).  
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emotional arousal is intense, performance on memory tasks 
significantly decreases in accuracy.89 Responding to stressful situations 
divides our attention and reduces our capacity to process and 
remember events.90 
Whether stressed or not, humans are also vulnerable to 
confirmation bias, the cognitive tendency to ignore facts that are 
inconsistent with our hypotheses or beliefs and focus on details that 
support them.91 If one suspects someone is guilty of a crime, one is 
more likely to focus on information supporting that suspicion and 
overlook information that would disconfirm the view.92 Confirmation 
bias is not limited to police officers, of course — it is a human 
cognitive tendency common to lay and professional persons.93 For 
example, commentators have noted that judges also display 
confirmation bias, tending to find errors harmless or not depending on 
whether the court believes a defendant is guilty.94 
We reason from schemata, mental categories for how situations will 
play out based on our experiences and beliefs.95 If someone or some 
situation resembles one previously experienced, these schemata shape 
our expectancies and shape our perceptions to confirm our beliefs.96 
In ambiguous situations where information is missing, schemata fill in 
 
 89 LOFTUS, supra note 86, at 33; Deffenbacher et al., supra note 88. 
 90 See Sven-Åke Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A Critical 
Review, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284, 284-304 (1992); Maria S. Zaragoza & Sean M. Lane, 
Processing Resources and Eyewitness Suggestibility, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 305, 307-10 (1998). 
 91 See THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN 
REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 33 (1991); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A 
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 198-99 (1998).  
 92 For a discussion and examples in the criminal context see, for example, Keith 
A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases, WIS. L. REV. 291, 296-316 (2006). 
 93 See Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United States 
Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 414, 421-28 (2011); James 
Friedrich, Primary Error Detection and Minimization (PEDMIN) Strategies in Social 
Cognition: A Reinterpretation of Confirmation Bias Phenomena, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 298, 
298 (1993); Nickerson, supra note 91, at 175-218; Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, 
First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q.J. ECON. 37, 41-48 
(1999).  
 94 Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should 
Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (1995); Findley & Scott, supra 
note 92, at 349-50. 
 95 See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 14 (2002). 
 96 See id. 
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the gaps, leading people to believe or perceive based on past 
experiences and beliefs.97 To translate in terms of operations in the 
field, an officer may reason thusly: I’ve caught a lot of guilty guys who 
look like this one, in this high-crime area, and this one looks guilty 
too.98 
When a search or seizure yields evidence, hindsight bias and 
outcome bias can reshape perceptions. Hindsight bias is a “knew-it-all-
along” effect in which the outcome seems more likely in retrospect.99 
Hindsight bias arises when we “update” our memory with the new 
information, subtly reshaping our memory of what happened to make 
the outcome appear more certain.100 Outcome bias is a related but 
different cognitive distortion in which the outcome influences our 
judgment about whether the judgment call was sound or wrong.101 
The reiterative effect of documenting one’s judgment calls — in 
reports, in testimony, for example — can further entrench subtly 
reshaped memories because reiteration heightens the perception of 
certainty.102 
Hearing all sides of the story is thus all the more important because 
of the fallibility of human perception and tendency toward unwitting 
 
 97 See id. 
 98 See also, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime 
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment 
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1595-1604 (2008) (discussing the use of a 
claim that an encounter occurs in a high-crime area in supporting reasonable 
suspicion); cf., e.g., John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in 
Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 20-21 (1983) (finding evidence 
that social labeling creates expectancies about true dispositions or capabilities). 
 99 See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome 
on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288, 293, 296-97 (1975); 
Erin M. Harley, Keri A. Carlsen & Geoffrey R. Loftus, The “Saw-It-All-Along” Effect: 
Demonstrations of Visual Hindsight Bias, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 960, 962-64 
(2004); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events 
After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311 (1990); Ulrich Hoffrage, 
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Updating?, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 566, 566-67 (2000); Lawrence J. Sanna, 
Norbert Schwarz, Eulena M. Small, Accessibility Experiences and the Hindsight Bias: I 
Knew It All Along Versus It Could Never Have Happened, 30 MEMORY & COGNITION 
1288, 1288-89 (2002). 
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Fast and Frugal Memory, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 191 (1999).  
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distortions of perception.103 Yet as discussed in Part I.A.1, one of the 
key participants, the defendant, has strong reasons to stay silent, 
leaving part of the story untold.104 This compounds the problems with 
reliance on testimony in reconstructing the facts and the need for 
other sources of information that can show more of the story. 
3. Ugly Credibility Contests 
The third challenge of traditional reliance on testimony and reports 
is the ugly credibility contests that often ensue if the defendant does 
dispute officer accounts. Neither side emerges unscathed — 
defendants are often assumed to be lying criminals with serious 
credibility problems.105 The police are impugned as liars, evidence 
planters, and abusers of power.106 Courts are also burdened, awash in 
deeply partisan and divergent stories in which both sides are 
smeared.107 
The credibility contest is an uneven one. Stories proffered by 
defendants are more likely to be discounted; indeed defendants were 
historically deemed unqualified to testify under oath.108 Claiming the 
officer is lying is a risky move because it risks alienating the fact-
finder.109 Moreover, judges are keenly aware of the consequences of 
 
 103 See discussion and sources cited supra notes 86–102. 
 104 See discussion and sources cited supra notes 69–79. 
 105 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt 
Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1695 (1987) (discussing the credibility difficulties 
defendants face). 
 106 See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1143 n.5 (2014) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (noting the account of the defendant’s battered girlfriend that police 
coerced her into letting them into the house by threatening to take her child away); 
Jones v. United States, 16 A.3d 966, 968-69 (D.C. 2011) (discussing defendant’s 
allegation that the police arrested him and roughed him up because he witnessed them 
beating a suspect and tried to speak up); Commonwealth v. Sparks, 746 N.E.2d 133, 
138 (Mass. 2001) (discussing the defendant’s allegation that police planted the 
evidence found during the search of his home); People v. McGirt, 603 N.Y.S.2d 164, 
165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (discussing defendant’s claim that that the planted 
evidence on him after using a ruse to get him out of his parents’ apartment to search 
him); State v. Pogue, 17 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (noting the 
defendant’s claim that the police planted the drug evidence during a vehicle search). 
 107 See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 118 (1995) (noting that “the trial 
judge will often have to weigh conflicting accounts of what transpired”). 
 108 Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66 (2000). 
 109 See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What Is 
a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 
116 (1999) (discussing how defendants face risks when telling stories that clash with 
the schemata harbored by jurors).  
  
920 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:897 
suggesting that the officer is a liar, which can end a career by 
rendering the officer unusable as a witness.110 There are powerful 
institutional pressures against making such a finding.111 
There are good reasons why mistakes may arise from people trying 
in good faith to recount their perceptions in the stress and heat of the 
moment.112 People recalling events in conscious good faith may have 
perceptions unwittingly skewed by confirmation, hindsight, and 
outcome biases.113 Yet faced with deeply divergent stories and no other 
way to reconstruct the event, courts have difficulty spotting and 
supporting findings of potential mistakes in perception.114 
Increasingly, criminal procedure doctrine has developed a phalanx 
of rules that reduce the need to have to delve into competing 
accounts.115 One of the most oft-reiterated positions in constitutional 
criminal procedure is that courts will not delve into pretext or 
subjective intent so long as an objective basis exists to justify the 
officer’s conduct.116 Even where an officer’s stated rationale for a 
search or seizure is incorrect, so long as another basis to justify the 
exercise of power can be found, the court will inquire no further.117 
Among the oft-stated rationales for the limits on judicial inquiry are 
the administrative difficulties and inefficiencies of case-by-case inquiry 
into the mystery of police motives.118 
 
 110 Cf. Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1341, 1352 (1996); see Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do 
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1043-47 (1996).  
 111 Slobogin, supra note 110. 
 112 See discussion in text and sources cited supra notes 86–102. 
 113 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 114 See, e.g., Fuzzard v. State, 13 P.3d 1163, 1165-67 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) 
(discussing difficulties posed by conflicting witness and defendant accounts in the 
context of domestic violence cases); People v. Naylor, 893 N.E.2d 653, 668 (Ill. 2008) 
(finding that the trial court committed reversible error when, “the trial court was 
faced with two different versions of events, both of which were credible” and decided 
to believe the officers over the defendant based on erroneously admitted evidence 
used to impeach the defendant); State v. Mangrum, 403 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tenn. 
2013) (discussing difficulty determining the proper charges because of conflicting 
accounts). 
 115 For a discussion, see Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in 
Criminal Procedure, 44 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1407, 1421-26 (2011).  
 116 See e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007); Devenpeck v. Alford, 
543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 363 (2001); 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 220-21, 235 n.1 (1973). 
 117 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536-40 (2014); Devenpeck, 543 
U.S. at 153-54. 
 118 E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.  
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The consequences of judicial reluctance to inquire for 
socioeconomically disadvantaged minority communities bearing the 
heaviest burden of searches and seizures are intensely controversial.119 
Scholars have argued that cases such as Whren v. United States, which 
declined to inquire into whether a stop for a minor offense was 
actually a pretext to target young black men for a search, create “a 
license to make racial distinctions.”120 Recently, Devon Carbado has 
argued that the tolerance of racial profiling in constitutional criminal 
procedure is a contributing cause of the heightened risk of minority 
community members being killed by the police.121 The lack of scrutiny 
or a remedy undermines trust and perceptions of legitimacy, and can 
lead to what Bennet Capers terms “small rebellions.”122 And, as 
discussed in the next section, trust may become so eroded that 
interests may shift and converge toward a paradigm shift in police 
regulation with important implications for how courts adjudicate 
criminal procedure questions. 
B. Odd Bedfellows Converge in Interests on Cameras 
No one likes being the object of surveillance — and that includes 
the masters of surveillance, the police.123 Historically, police 
departments resisted recording even a portion of their work — 
interrogations — because of concerns that videotaping would be 
costly, prevent suspects from talking, and reveal strategies that might 
be unpalatable to judges and juries.124 In recent years, as more 
 
 119 For critiques see, for example, DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS 
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27-41, 48-52 (1999); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race 
and Place, 44 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 43, 56-72 (2009); Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. 
Moran, The Story of Law and American Racial Consciousness: Building a Canon One Case 
at a Time, 76 UMKC L. REV. 851, 873-74 (2008). 
 120 Carbado & Moran, supra note 119, at 873-74. 
 121 Devon W. Carbado, The Legalization of Racial Profiling: Setting the Stage for 
Police Violence (Feb. 18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  
 122 I. Bennet Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 865 (2008). 
 123 See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The 
Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability 
and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 629 (2004) (discussing debate 
over the need for police privacy in interrogation and the concern that opening up the 
interrogation to public scrutiny would cripple the power to obtain confessions); 
Richard A. Leo & Kimberly D. Richman, Mandate the Electronic Recording of Police 
Interrogations, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 791, 792 (2007) (noting that many police 
departments continue to resist recording interrogations though electronic recording 
has become increasingly common). 
 124 WILLIAM A. GELLER, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIDEOTAPING INTERROGATIONS AND 
CONFESSIONS 3, 6 (1993); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A 
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investigators have gained experience with recording suspect 
interviews, there has been a shift toward appreciating the benefits of 
recording interrogations.125 Because of a combination of legislation, 
judicial and prosecutorial encouragement, and voluntary departmental 
action, more than half of law enforcement agencies now record at least 
some interrogations, according to estimates.126 
Putting body cameras on officers is much more pervasive and 
intrusive because a wider range of officer conduct and much more of 
an officer’s day are recorded.127 The logic of regulation by body camera 
resembles the brilliance of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon idea — get 
people to behave because an eye could be on them at any time.128 The 
problem is that the Panopticon was an idea for a prison.129 Non-
prisoners are likely to resist. 
Officers, police unions, and civil liberties groups have expressed 
concerns over body cameras such as chilling communications with 
witnesses and victims and trampling the privacy of the public and 
officers.130 People face having their most painful, stressful and 
embarrassing moments preserved for replay when law enforcement 
encounters are recorded.131 Public disclosure laws also pose the risk 
that such painful and embarrassing videos may be ordered disclosed to 
individuals who may even post the video on YouTube or some other 
public platform for consumption.132 
A July 2013 study of a sample of 254 police departments across the 
United States found that less than a quarter of the responding 
 
Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 385 
(2007). 
 125 See Kassin et al., supra note 124, at 396. 
 126 See Lassiter et al., Camera Perspective Bias, supra note 22, at 54; Thomas P. 
Sullivan, Recording Federal Custodial Interviews, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1297, 1311-12 
(2008). 
 127 For the results of our study of body camera policy provisions on what police 
actions must be recorded see infra Part II.  
 128 See Miran Božovič, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 
13-18 (Miran Božovič ed., 1995) (explaining Bentham’s idea of the Panopticon, which 
would enable more efficient and effective governance of prison inmates by creating a 
structure that permitted the perfect visibility of prisoners arrayed around an opaque 
watchtower). 
 129 See id. at 8. 
 130 See, e.g., Douglas Hanks, For Police Cameras, Going Dark Can Be a Challenge, 
MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/ 
miami-dade/article4480249.html (discussing concerns among officers, including 
recording community members on some of the worst days of their lives). 
 131 Fan, Police Body Cameras, supra note 20, at 397-409.  
 132 Id. at 397-98, 404-06. 
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departments used body cameras.133 Then came what the executive 
director of the organization representing rank-and-file police officers 
calls “a watershed moment in policing” — the national turmoil over 
the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson.134 Witnesses offered 
polarized and dramatically divergent accounts of what happened.135 
Some witnesses said Officer Darren Wilson punched and shot Brown 
in the back even though Brown held his hands up in surrender.136 In 
an account supported by some other witnesses, Wilson said Brown 
punched him, tried to grab his gun, then ran away, but turned to 
charge him when Wilson pursued him and Wilson shot in fear for his 
life.137 It was another deeply divergent painful credibility contest — 
with no camera recording the key events to show what unfolded.138 
One of the biggest reforms associated with the Ferguson turmoil are 
body cameras for police officers.139 Protests erupted after a grand jury 
refused to indict Wilson, drawing national and international attention 
to the heightened risk of being killed by the police that black men in 
America face.140 Seven months later, the U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 133 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-
WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2014), 
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 134 Sandhya Somashekhar, Wesley Lowery, Keith L. Alexander, Kimberly Kindy & 
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teen-Michael-Brown.html; Jon Swaine, Oliver Laughland, Jamiles Lartey & Ciara 
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GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/the-
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would conclude that forensic evidence was inconsistent with claims 
that Brown was shot in the back with his hands up in surrender.141 But 
by then, police had realized that public support and trust was turning 
sharply against law enforcement officers.142 
Several police departments had been considering or piloting a shift 
to police body cameras before, but Ferguson provided a compelling 
push.143 Proponents of body cameras frequently point with hope to 
studies indicating that deploying body cameras reduces the frequency 
of complaints against officers and uses of force by officers.144 Trust-
building and protection is an oft-stated rationale for adopting body 
cameras.145 Advocates of adopting body cameras also argue that 
officers and the public behave better when they know they are being 
 
counted-police-killings-2015-young-black-men. 
 141 See BROWN DEATH INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 135, at 7-8; Somashekhar 
et al., supra note 134. 
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2015), https://www.unlv.edu/news/article/conduct-camera (reporting findings that 
officers initially skeptical of body cameras changed their views after Ferguson because 
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(Sept. 5, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5444779 (noting the department had been 
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WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 20 (2014), https://ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf. 
 145 See, e.g., DC BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM REGULATIONS AMENDMENT ACT OF 
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interactions and statements made during encounters between MPD officers and the 
public, and ensure the safety of both MPD officers and the public.”); PHILA. POLICE 
DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21, at § 1.A.2 (2015) (effective Apr. 20, 2015); SAN DIEGO POLICE 
DEP’T PROCEDURE NO. 1.49, at 1 (2015) (“Cameras provide additional documentation 
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recorded.146 Proponents also believe that recording events reduces 
unfounded complaints.147 
The first and most frequently cited scientific evidence for the 
benefits of body cameras comes from a study that randomly assigned 
half of the fifty-four officers of the Rialto, California police department 
to wearing body cameras.148 During the study period, officers without 
body cameras had twice the incidence of uses of force compared to the 
group using body cameras.149 The between-groups difference in 
complaints was not statistically significant largely due to the low 
number of complaints against either group in the small department 
and community.150 However, comparing the number of complaints 
during the body camera study period to those before body cameras 
were implemented indicated a significant reduction in the number of 
complaints of more than 90%.151 A later study of the Phoenix, Arizona 
Police Department found that complaints against officers in a precinct 
deploying body cameras declined by 22.5%, during a period in which 
complaints against officers in other comparable precincts without 
body cameras rose.152 A study of Mesa, Arizona police officers also 
found a reduction in complaints against officers wearing body 
cameras.153 The San Diego police department also reported a reduction 
in uses of force and complaints against police deploying body 
cameras.154 Other studies are ongoing.155 
Groups that often take opposing positions on policing and 
surveillance debates have united to usher in an era of rapid transition 
to body cameras.156 Galvanized by the events in Ferguson, major civil 
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rights and civil liberties groups united to call for the required use of 
body cameras and other reforms.157 Even the ACLU, which has a track 
record of opposing extending surveillance and strong concern for 
privacy, joined the call for putting body cameras on the police.158 Civil 
rights and civil liberties groups supported body cameras as a way to 
police the police, promote greater transparency, and reduce the risk of 
injuries and deaths in law enforcement encounters.159 
Also motivated by the events in Ferguson, police departments began 
to see the benefits of body cameras.160 Police chiefs who might been 
reluctant five years ago to adopt body cameras realized their utility in 
offering evidence of what happened, re-building trust, and reducing 
unfounded complaints.161 A recent study of officer perceptions of body 
cameras, based on surveys of Orlando police officers, also found a 
widespread belief that recording might improve the behavior of the 
public toward officers.162 Officers who were previously skeptical of 
body cameras are also realizing that body cameras can help exonerate 
them if they are falsely accused of wrongdoing.163 
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Body cameras offer a powerful example of Derrick Bell’s interest-
convergence thesis that progress for the powerless occurs when the 
reform converges with the interests of the powerful.164 Police 
departments across the nation have announced plans to adopt body 
cameras, resulting in a surge of sales of police-worn body cameras.165 
Stock prices surged for Taser International, maker of one of the most 
popular brands of body cameras and a cloud-based service to store the 
footage, and other companies in the body camera business.166 A recent 
survey by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and Major County 
Sheriffs’ Association found that 95% of 70 law enforcement agencies 
surveyed have either committed to putting body cameras on officers or 
have already done so.167 The convergence of diverse interests across 
unusual bedfellows has thus created a major shift in the recording of 
police encounters in the United States. 
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II. THE FUTURE WILL BE RECORDED 
 
 
The spurt of police body cameras hitting the streets presents 
important policy questions about what will be recorded or not, public 
disclosure, privacy, and witness protection.168 Many state legislatures 
are considering bills to help answer the host of questions raised by 
putting hundreds or thousands of cameras into the community on 
police.169 A small but growing number of legislatures have succeeded 
in passing legislation to provide some guidelines for the police 
departments and communities in their state.170 Legislators in other 
jurisdictions are wrestling with disagreements over police discretion, 
privacy protection, and public disclosure.171 Even though a historic 
 
 168 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1794, 1805-08 (2015) (noting the numerous important open policy questions 
about body cameras). 
 169 See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Lawmakers Focus on Police Body-
Worn Cameras (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/08/05/lawmakers-focus-
on-police-body-worn-cameras.aspx (noting that at least 37 states as of August 2015 
had considered body-worn camera legislation); see also, e.g., Jeremy Brilliant, Bill 
Would Keep Most Police Body Cam Video Secret, WTHR 13 (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://www.wthr.com/story/31014061/indiana-bill-would-give-police-departments-
option-of-not-releasing-video-footage (reporting on pending legislation in Indiana to 
exempt body camera footage from public disclosure to protect privacy). 
 170 See, e.g., CONN. STAT. ANN. § 29-6d(g) (2016) (specifying circumstances when 
recording by body-worn cameras is prohibited); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480.365 
(2016) (giving agencies guidance on when portable recording devices must be 
activated or deactivated); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (2016) (prescribing limits on 
recording vis body camera); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240 (2016) (prescribing body 
camera guidelines for South Carolina law enforcement agencies); TEX. GOV’T CODE 
§ 411.441-48 (2016) (prescribing recording policies); Gen. Assemb. 1304, art. 10, 
99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2015) (effective Jan. 1, 2016) (providing guidelines on 
recording). 
 171 See, e.g., Rachel Alexander, Body Camera Clarity Sought: Bills Seek to Balance 
Rights of Individuals, Public, SPOKESMAN-REV., Feb. 19, 2015, 2015 WLNR 5052803 
(describing competing bills and perspectives); Barbara Rodriguez, Bills on Body 
Body camera footage of 
police officers responding to 
calls about loud yelling in an 
apartment from someone 
who may be mentally ill. 
Officers are engaging in a 
knock and talk consensual 
encounter with the subject 
of the complaints. 
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convergence of interest ushered in the body camera era, the groups 
come from very different perspectives on police discretion, privacy 
and how the public is best protected.172 
In the absence of legislatively prescribed rules, or based on 
delegations of power to frame specific policies, many police 
departments have taken the lead in drafting policies on body-worn 
cameras addressing the important questions.173 The policies vary in 
communities across the United States.174 This section reports findings 
from the first study to code and analyze the available body camera 
policies among police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the 
United States.175 The policies collected and coded were those 
obtainable as of December 2015. The results reported in this article 
focus on policies regarding what activities police must record.176 
While there is heterogeneity in departmental requirements, the results 
reveal a coming future where most law enforcement encounters — 
including some of the most opaque domains of criminal procedure — 
will be illuminated. The hundreds of thousands of hours of footage 
will be linked to the police reports that land on lawyers’ desks to start 
a criminal case, offering litigants a rich source of evidence for 
introduction and courts greater power than ever before to replay 
events in contested criminal procedure contexts.177 
A. Body Camera Policies on What Must Be Recorded 
The police body camera revolution implicates some of the greatest 
dilemmas of modern organized society, including how much 
 
Cameras in Iowa Showcase Looming Challenges, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 21, 2016), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2016/02/21/bills-body-cameras-
iowa-showcase-looming-challenges/80708172/ (reporting on heated debate over how 
to protect privacy); Dennis Romboy, Legislators Wrestling with Police Body Cam Laws, 
DESERET NEWS, Feb. 18, 2016, 2016 WLNR 5050778 (discussing major disagreements 
over minimum standards for police use of body cameras and questions about personal 
privacy).  
 172 See, e.g., Tanzina Vega, Rights Groups: Police Use of Body Cameras Raises Privacy 
Concerns, CNN (May 15, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/15/politics/body-
cameras-civil-rights-privacy-coalition/ (discussing policy disagreements). 
 173 See examples of body camera policies cited supra notes 24, 26. 
 174 See discussion infra Part II.A and summaries in Tables 1, 2. 
 175 As discussed, infra, Part II, not all municipal police departments have adopted 
body cameras, or have formulated or made available body camera policies yet. We 
therefore coded the policies from the jurisdictions listed in Appendix 1. 
 176 Findings from the portion of this empirical study dealing with privacy policies 
are reported separately in another project focused on privacy questions.  
 177 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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discretion to accord the police and the right balance between 
surveillance and privacy. Because the law often lags behind technology 
in policing, departments across the nation have had to take the first 
pass at crafting policies that address important questions of privacy, 
police discretion and public safety.178 To shed light on the future that 
is emerging, this study collected and coded body camera policies 
issued by police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the 
United States as of December 2015. 
Data collection focused on municipal police departments, because 
the scope of work and municipal coverage is generally broadest with 
these primary agencies compared to other specialized agencies that 
may also serve the region.179 Examining the 100 largest cities offered 
diversity of region and city size while still focusing on areas where 
more people will be affected. The cities ranged in size from more than 
8.4 million people in New York, to places with less than 250,000 such 
as Fremont, California or Chesapeake, Virginia.180 While smaller 
jurisdictions such as Rialto, Ferguson, and Spokane are also deploying 
body cameras, this study focused on the largest cities because their 
policies impact the most people and can set the standards for others to 
emulate.181 These cities also generate the largest volume of business 
for the increasingly lucrative body camera hardware and software 
industry.182 
A team of eight persons investigated the body camera adoption 
status of each jurisdiction. If the city had plans to adopt body cameras 
or had deployed them, the investigators sought a copy of the body 
camera policy and coded the policies as well as the proffered reasons 
for adopting body cameras.183 Through an iterative process based on 
 
 178 See examples of body camera policies cited supra notes 24, 26. 
 179 See, e.g., David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sheriff as A 
Distinctive Policing Modality, 14 AM. J. POLICE 123, 123-25 (1995) (discussing the 
different agencies that may serve a region and their respective scopes of work).  
 180 See The Largest US Cities: Cities Ranked 1 to 100, CITY MAYORS, 
http://www.citymayors.com/gratis/uscities_100.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); Top 
100 Metropolitan Areas – Ranked by Population, 2014 Estimates, BARUCH COLL. (July 1, 
2014), http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/world_cities/largest_cities-usa.htm; Top 
100 Biggest Cities, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/top1.html (last visited Feb. 
18, 2016).  
 181 See, e.g., Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 840-51 (2008) (discussing mechanisms of policy diffusion by 
emulation).  
 182 See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, The Big Money in Police Body Cameras, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/the-big-
money-in-police-body-cameras/392009/ (discussing lucrative technology contracts). 
 183 The Brennan Center and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press offer 
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review of the scope of issues and positions covered by the body 
camera policies, we generated a policy codebook with 51 variables. 
The variables covered issues such as the extent of officer discretion 
regarding what to record, what types of situations must be recorded, 
when recording must stop, public and officer access to recordings and 
data retention, redaction and storage issues. 
Table 1 summarizes the status of body camera adoption in the 100 
municipal departments examined. The vast majority of the police 
departments examined — 88 out of 100 — have piloted or used police 
body cameras or have plans to do so. Of those, the great majority — 
69 out of the 88 —launched or will launch body cameras in 2014 or 
later, showing the very recent nature of the major shift. 
 
Table 1. Body Camera Adoption Status among Police Departments in 
the 100 Largest U.S. Cities 
Body Camera Adoption Status Number of 
Departments 
Does not use officer-worn body cameras 12
Has piloted or is piloting the use of body cameras 36
Plans to pilot or use body cameras in the future 24
Extending body camera use throughout force 28
 
Among those 88 departments that have used or plan to use body 
cameras, 39 had publicly available body camera policies. In addition, 
three departments were in states that had enacted body camera 
legislation that gives some guidelines about recording policy. The final 
sample for coding was therefore 42 — just under half of the police 
departments that either are considering using body cameras or have 
piloted or deployed them. 
Among the departments with available laws and policies for coding, 
the most popular model of police recording discretion is a limited 
discretion model. Under a limited discretion model, police are directed 
to record specified enforcement activities and given discretion over 
whether to record at other times.184 The vast majority of the available 
 
excellent resources for linking researchers to body camera policies. See Police Body 
Camera Policies, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www. 
brennancenter.org/body-cam-city-map; Access to Police Body-Worn Camera Video, 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/bodycams (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2016). We searched these and other department-specific sites and where 
policies could not be located, we contacted individual departments. 
 184 See, e.g., N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR 
THE NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS IN NYC: AN ASSESSMENT OF NYPD’S PILOT PROGRAM 
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policies — 34 out of 42 — spell out a limited discretion model. The 
remaining eight departmental policies coded have adopted a highly 
limited discretion model requiring that body cameras be on during all 
enforcement encounters with the public, unless an exception applies. 
Table 2 lists enforcement events and the number of departments 
among the 42 coded that require recording of the event. The 
enforcement events are listed by order of frequency of specification in 
policies requiring recording. Nearly all the departments mandate 
recording of Terry and traffic stops, searches, arrests, pursuits, and 
responses to calls for service. Most require the recording of use of 
force or encounters that escalate, becoming adversarial. In light of the 
controversy over the death of Freddie Gray during transportation 
while in custody, it is also notable that most of the policies mandate 
recordings of transportation of suspects in custody.185 
 
Table 2. Events to be Recorded According to the 42 Publicly Available 
Body Camera Recording Policies and Laws Coded186 






Terry stops 39 1
Traffic stops 39 1
Arrests 39 0
Pursuits, foot or traffic 38 0
Responding to calls for service 36 1
Searches 36 0
Encounters that escalate or get 
adversarial 
34 2
Use of force 34 1




Consensual encounters 11 17
 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY ii (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/oignypd/assets/downloads/pdf/nypd-body-camera-report.pdf (defining a limited 
discretion model). 
 185 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, Starkly Different Accounts of 
Freddie Gray’s Death as Trial of Officer Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, at A20 
(discussing the controversy and mystery over Freddie Gray’s death while being 
transported in custody). 
 186 The numbers in the right-most two columns may not add up to 42 because 
some policies may not specify a position on the issue.  
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What is not as consistently mandated is the recording of consensual 
encounters. In criminal procedure and police parlance, a consensual 
encounter is the initiation of an encounter by an officer, typically in 
situations where there is either no articulable basis yet for reasonable 
suspicion or it is unclear if there is a sufficient basis.187 Consensual 
encounters are unregulated by the Fourth Amendment because they 
are not deemed a seizure.188 Targeting for a consensual encounter is 
intensely controversial because of the lack of regulation or scrutiny.189 
Given the tendency of people to comply when approached by police 
officers, the consensual part of a “consensual encounter” can resemble 
a legal fiction.190 Because the selection of persons for consensual 
encounters is unregulated, the risk of targeting due to hunches based 
on a person’s race, gender, age and socioeconomic background is 
heightened.191 
Recording consensual encounters is an important step toward 
illuminating a controversial and opaque domain. Given the 
unregulated and controversial nature of consensual encounters, 
perhaps what is more remarkable is that nearly half of the departments 
 
 187 See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir. 1997) (describing 
the unregulated nature of consensual encounters, “which may be initiated without any 
objective level of suspicion”).  
 188 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1991) (“Our cases make it 
clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an 
individual and asks a few questions. . . . The encounter will not trigger Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.”); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (“The initial contact between the officers and respondent, where 
they simply asked if he would step aside and talk with them, was clearly the sort of 
consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest.”). 
 189 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, 
and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011) (discussing 
controversies due to racial biases).  
 190 See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of 
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (“[T]he Court’s Fourth Amendment consent 
jurisprudence is either based on serious errors about human behavior and judgment, 
or else has devolved into a legal fiction of the crudest sort—a mere device for attaining 
the desired legal consequence.”). 
 191 See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply: 
Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 
1486 (2007) (“Police are free to initiate a consensual encounter with an individual for 
any reason or no reason, perhaps based on a whim or a “hunch” that cannot be 
supported by specific and articulable facts.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line 
Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth 
Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 509 (2001) 
(“Requiring no objective indication of criminality, a consensual encounter can be 
initiated for no reason or for any reason at all, including the kind of inchoate hunches 
and suspicions disallowed even for stops, the least intrusive form of seizure.”) 
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with policies coded mandate the recording of consensual encounters. 
Well over half either provide for discretionary or mandatory recording 
of such encounters. While a good step forward, wider-spread 
mandating that consensual encounters be recorded would better serve 
the goals of increasing trust and transparency that are oft-stated in 
body camera policies. 
The early movers in framing body camera recording policies play an 
important role as exemplars for other jurisdictions joining the body 
camera bandwagon.192 The body camera policies are also exemplars for 
legislatures about what policies are feasible and already deployed in 
the field.193 When it comes to new technology, courts and legislatures 
often trail behind practice, and may end up accepting or adjusting the 
practice that has been forged in the field.194 Examining the early and 
major jurisdiction movers in forging body camera recording policy 
reveals a future where many of the main staples of criminal procedure 
— stops, searches, arrests, responses to calls for service, uses of force, 
and even the enforcement of minor crimes or infractions — will be 
recorded. Indeed, there appears to be much more consensus about 
required recording of enforcement encounters than the private and 
sensitive contexts that should not be captured on camera. 
B. The Coming Replay Power: Bigger and Better than Before 
The recording of the main staple events contested in criminal 
procedure law has important implications for lawyers and courts as 
well as the police. The nature of the evidence and information 
available to reconstruct events will powerfully change. Currently, 
when a new case lands in the hands of a prosecutor or defense 
attorney, the police report is often the first guide to the attorneys on 
both sides to figure out what the case about.195 The police report also 
 
 192 See, e.g., Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Innovation and Diffusion 
Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 307, 310-27 (Paul A. 
Sabatier & Christopher M. Weible eds., 3d ed. 2014) (discussing models of emulation, 
early and late adoption); Jill Clark, Policy Diffusion and Program Scope: Research 
Directions, 15 PUBLIUS 61 (1985) (discussing leaders and laggards in policy diffusion). 
 193 See, e.g., Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1174 (1973) (offering a model of diffusion).  
 194 Cf. Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 539-42 (2011) (discussing the benefits of judicial delay when it 
comes to new technologies in law enforcement).  
 195 See, e.g., Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 82, at 1240-41 (discussing how 
overburdened attorneys often first get to know what the case is about through the 
police report contained in a thin file). 
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guides later officer testimony because officers rely on their reports to 
refresh their memory when they testify after the event.196 Indeed, 
before testifying, officers often read their police reports in the 
courthouse hallways to revive memories blurred by time and 
numerous other encounters.197 Particularly in run-of-the-mill cases, 
officer testimony is often limited to what is in the report.198 
The report that has such power in framing a criminal case from its 
inception is limited by its one-dimensional nature, committed to paper 
as a summary of the perceptions of the officer involved. As the 
Simmons case study at the outset of Part I illustrates, this perspective 
is driven by what is of evidentiary value to the government.199 Many 
details do not make it into the report, which is necessarily a summary 
focused on justifying the enforcement action and documenting the 
evidence obtained from it.200 
In jurisdictions where officers use body cameras, this thin paper 
account is supplemented by multimedia capturing a fuller range of 
details from a broader perspective. Most of the departmental policies 
coded in this study explicitly specify that police reports must note that 
there is accompanying video of the incident.201 Defendants may also 
request disclosure of the video in discovery.202 This video can speak 
beyond officer accounts at suppression hearings even when the 
defendant does not speak. The availability of video thus can address 
the challenges of a criminal justice system where one party to disputed 
events is repeatedly advised to stay silent.203 
 
 196 Darren T. Kavinoky, Knowledge as the Foundation, in STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING 
DUI CASES IN CALIFORNIA (Aspatore ed., 2008), 2008 WL 5689409, at *11. 
 197 See id. (“We see them in the hallways, reading those reports and trying to 
refresh their recollection.”). 
 198 See id. (“There is usually a significant lag time between the time the person is 
arrested and the time the case goes to trial. During that time, the officer has forgotten 
that client and the specific details . . . so we know when the officers get on the stand 
that they will testify to what is included in the police report—no more and no less.”). 
 199 See discussion supra notes 52–63. 
 200 See, e.g., People v. Ellis, No. 1–10–3661, 2012 WL 6861254, at *15 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Dec. 28, 2012) (noting that a police report is a summary and may omit some 
information).  
 201 Specifically, 31 out of the 42 body camera policies coded specify linkage 
between the report and the video. 
 202 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (requiring disclosure of 
evidence favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment); James W. 
McGee, Jr., DWI Discovery Trends in North Carolina, TRENDS IN DUI DISCOVERY, Sept. 
2015, at 81, 82 (noting that as a defense attorney in a jurisdiction with dash cameras 
and body cameras, he always makes a Brady request for the videotape). 
 203 See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
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The availability of video will also influence officer report-writing 
and testimony. Most of the jurisdictions coded explicitly state that the 
officer can review the body camera video in preparation for testimony 
and while writing reports. Indeed some departments require review of 
the video in preparing to testify.204 None of the policies limit officer 
review of the body camera video in preparing to testify. Where policies 
are silent, officers are free to review the body camera video in 
preparation to testify and competent officers and prosecutors will 
review that video in preparation for court. 
Through introduction and dispute by the parties, courts will also 
have access to the video of contested encounters. The availability of 
video generates for the courts a power to replay events to help 
reconstruct what happened rather than depend on partisan and often 
one-sided testimony. The audiovisual recording of a wider array of law 
enforcement activities than ever before is a major development for 
courts adjudicating criminal cases. The event replay power will also be 
greater than ever before. 
To date, courts tend to have video access to only a small portion of 
the contested law enforcement encounters they adjudicate. Most of the 
progress on recording has occurred in the context of police 
interrogations, which more than half of U.S. jurisdictions now 
record.205 But much of the evidence — and in some cases, the entire 
basis for prosecution — may come from searches and seizures or 
observations during police encounters in the non-interrogation 
context. Before body cameras, the main video window courts had into 
the search and seizure disputed in criminal procedure cases was 
through dash cameras.206 These dash camera videos yield only partial 
snapshots, often from a distant angle that misses important details.207 
Even in traffic stops, a dash camera does not capture the relevant 
details of what might give police probable cause for a search of the 
vehicle or an arrest of the person inside it. Compare for instance, the 
 
 204 See, e.g., Memorandum from T. Armstrong, Dir., Memphis Police Department to 
All Personnel (Sept. 23, 2015) (requiring that officers review body-worn camera 
footage before writing reports); Memorandum from Operational Support, San Diego 
Police Department 11 (July 8, 2015) (requiring that officers review digital evidence 
before completing reports to prime their recollection but “shall not write their reports 
based solely on what they viewed from the BWC recording”). 
 205 See, e.g., Lassiter et al., Camera Perspective Bias, supra note 22, at 154 (citing 
estimates). 
 206 See, e.g., State v. O’Neal, 7 So. 3d 182, 185 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (noting use of 
dash camera footage at suppression hearing); State v. Munsey, 424 S.W.3d 767, 769 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2014). 
 207 See discussion and video example supra notes 26–27. 
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two stills below from video of the same traffic stop.208 The still on the 
left is from the patrol vehicle dash camera.209 The still on the right is 
from the officer’s body camera.210 
 
View from patrol vehicle dash camera View from officer-worn body 
camera 
 
Now imagine if this traffic stop had been the one in Michael 
Whren’s case.211 Recall that in Whren v. United States, the Court 
recounts that when the officer decided to pull over Whren and his 
friend James Brown in their Pathfinder vehicle for minor traffic 
infractions, this occurred: 
The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the 
Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. 
They pulled up alongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped 
out and approached the driver’s door, identifying himself as a 
police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put 
the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver’s 
window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of 
 
 208 Sterling Police Dep’t, The Difference a Camera Can Make, YOUTUBE (Sept. 12, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXy17SIzpbQ. 
 209 Id. at 1:00. 
 210 Id. at 2:30. 
 211 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996). 
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what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s 
hands.212 
Let’s return to the question in Part I.A.1.213 Why were the two large 
plastic bags sitting boldly in plain view in Whren’s hands when Whren 
and Brown knew officers had been tailing them and were nervous 
enough to try to drive sharply away?214 The question has vexed 
scholars who have suggested that the facts in Whren are an example of 
testilying — telling a more legally palatable tale to avoid suppression 
of the evidence — that the Court ignores.215 Yet, without the 
defendant’s testimony offering a contrary story at the suppression 
hearing, nor video, there is not much a court can do. The evidence in 
the record is the officers’ testimony. As the still photos above indicate, 
even if the officers in Whren’s case had dash camera footage, it would 
not tell the lawyers or the court much. We cannot see what was in 
Whren’s lap. But the body camera footage would give the court much 
greater ability to replay the stop and check the story — and perhaps 
view the stop from a different perspective that includes a lap view — 
even if the defendant does not speak. 
III. RULES OF USE AND RESTRAINT FOR THE JUDICIAL POWER TO REPLAY 
The body camera revolution is also an evidentiary revolution. It may 
enable judges to see for themselves more of what occurred, beyond the 
partiality, perceptual frailties, and gaps of oral or written statements. 
Throughout American history, images have powerfully communicated 
calls for change.216 It takes seeing to spur action. Images can jolt 
people with power into concern. It was images of crowds grinning at 
lynchings and mob domination of justice that shocked the conscience 
of the nation and spurred the criminal procedure revolution.217 And it 
 
 212 Id.  
 213 See supra text accompanying note 66. 
 214 Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-09. 
 215 See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 68, at 384; Capers, Fourth Problem, supra note 68, at 
435 n.34. 
 216 See, e.g., NAT’L MUSEUM OF AFRICAN AM. HISTORY & CULTURE, DOUBLE EXPOSURE: 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PROMISE OF EQUALITY 10-55 (Laura Coyle & Michèle Gates 
Moresi eds., 2015) (offering examples of iconic photographs in the struggle for civil 
rights). 
 217 See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 2, at 56-57, 61, 69 (discussing linkages between 
the birth of modern criminal procedure and mob-dominated trials in the shadow of 
the threat of lynchings, documented by newspapers); see also, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, 
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 35-38 (2000) 
(discussing how the images were used in Cold War era propaganda against the United 
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was images of mass protests, of the slain, of the events preceding 
death, and of children offering hugs and seeking a safer future that 
spurred the body camera revolution.218 
Beyond the headlines, in the daily work of courts, body camera 
video has an important role to play in improving the accuracy and 
quality of justice in criminal procedure cases. This Part proposes rules 
of judicial review to cultivate regular use of the audiovisual record in 
criminal procedure cases and discourage gaps and omissions due to 
selective recording. While this Part argues for the normalization of 
judicial reliance on the audiovisual record, it also offers rules of 
judicial restraint so that the audiovisual record is properly used. 
A. Standardizing the Audiovisual Record, Questioning Absences 
The transformation of the evidentiary record by body camera video 
in criminal procedure cases is an important advance to address the 
problems with traditional reliance on testimony and text and the 
frequent absence of the defendant’s voice. Cameras can help prove 
accurate claims, disprove false claims, and give judges and juries a 
better sense of how quickly and stressfully events can unfold for 
officers and suspects — as well as what it is like to be on the receiving 
end of a search or seizure.219 Features on video storage systems 
regulate and track access to the video and can prevent editing and 
tampering.220 Policies may also limit officers’ ability to access or edit 
the stored video and ensure proper chain-of-custody for the 
evidence.221 Video replay can be an important improvement over 
 
States and the influence on the Court); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: 
HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 30-59 
(1994) (discussing how media images of violence influenced civil rights).  
 218 See, e.g., Ehrenfreund, supra note 16 (discussing how the most major reform to 
arise from the Ferguson protests may be body cameras for police officers); Sanburn, 
supra note 16 (discussing the call for body cameras by Michael Brown’s family, 
presenting protest images, and noting the rapid uptake of body camera reforms). 
 219 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 133, at 6 (reporting agencies’ 
experience that having body cameras leads to a quicker and more accurate resolution 
and reduces unfounded complaints); see also supra Part I (discussing how video 
bettered captured an invasive search experience than police reports or testimony).  
 220 See, e.g., Alexander Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat, Danah Boyd, Police Body-Worn 
Cameras 6 (Data & Soc’y Research Inst., Working Paper, 2015), 
http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.pdf (discussing the 
security features of various systems). 
 221 See, e.g., CHULA VISTA POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL § 449.8 (2015), 
https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/ChulaVistaPD_CA-BWC-Policy.pdf (“All audio and 
video recordings are part of the investigative record and shall be preserved in their 
original format without deletion, editing or tampering according to the retention 
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reconstruction by error-prone memory and ugly credibility contests.222 
Event replay can also fill information gaps in a system where the 
defendant has strong incentives to remain silent.223 
Judges should regularly consult videos in adjudicating search and 
seizure suppression issues, where much of criminal procedure law is 
forged. On preliminary matters, such as whether evidence must be 
suppressed because it was seized in violation of the defendant’s rights, 
judges are the designated fact-finders who must resolve disputed 
questions of fact as well as law.224 Body camera footage can be an 
important aid in this duty. The ability to replay what happened on the 
ground also serves an important communicative and educative 
function in a system where the judges adjudicating criminal procedure 
questions tend to come from very different backgrounds and 
experiences than the people involved in criminal procedure cases.225 
As Judge Kozinski put it: 
Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from 
the class of people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos. 
The everyday problems of people who live in poverty are not 
close to our hearts and minds because that’s not how we and 
our friends live.226 
 
schedule. . . . Unauthorized tampering, editing or deletion of a video may result in 
discipline, up to and including termination.”); GREENSBORO POLICE DEP’T, GREENSBORO 
POLICE DEPARTMENT DIRECTIVES MANUAL, DIRECTIVE NO. 5.11 (2014), 
https://rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/NC/Greensboro_BWC_Policy.pdf (“No officer shall 
attempt to erase, edit or otherwise alter any data captured by a BWC.”); NORFOLK 
POLICE DEP’T, ADMINISTRATIVE SPECIAL ORDER 15-001: BODY-WORN CAMERAS 2 (2015), 
https://acluva.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015NorfolkPDPolicy.pdf (“Officers 
shall not edit, erase, duplicate, copy, share, or otherwise distribute in any manner 
BWC recordings without prior written authorization and approval by the Chief of 
Police.”).  
 222 See discussion supra Sections I.A.2–.3. 
 223 See discussion supra Section I.A.1. 
 224 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question 
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so 
deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”); Fields 
v. Bagley, 275 F.3d 478, 485 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that the trial court’s factual 
findings must be “supported by competent and credible evidence”).  
 225 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]the Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section of America. Take, for 
example, this Court, which consists of only nine men and women, all of them 
successful lawyers who studied at Harvard or Yale Law School. . . . [It is] a select, 
patrician, highly unrepresentative panel . . . .”). 
 226 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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Judges are less likely to have ever experienced a stop, search or arrest 
beyond a brief traffic stop, or the patdown and bag searches at the 
entrance to airports or entertainment venues. Judges are also unlikely 
to have to have had experience responding to an emergency call about 
a crime in progress, or any of the myriad stressful situations that 
officers face. Body camera footage can convey the realities both 
defendants and officers face outside the courtroom. 
As body camera evidence accumulates, it can be a valuable source of 
big data for courts to inform decision-making and evaluate rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure. Andrew Crespo has illuminated the 
potential of what he terms systemic facts to redress criminal courts’ 
transactional myopia — the case-specific focus on the facts rather than 
the larger pattern of data stored by courts.227 Systemic facts refer to 
data that courts acquire over time by processing a stream of cases.228 
This is a conceptually distinct from the traditional categories of 
adjudicative (case-specific) facts and legislative facts (externally 
generated general facts about the world).229 Courts have privileged 
access to systemic facts stored in filing cabinets, online data systems 
and transcripts, which can be amassed and analyzed to shed light into 
opaque and important criminal procedure issues.230 For example, 
search warrant affidavits and returns listing any items seized can be 
digitized and searched by full-text, high-speed software to evaluate 
issues such as boilerplate recitation, descriptive accuracy and even 
predictive accuracy.231 Audio and images from video provide an even 
richer trove of information besides searchable databases of text and 
numbers.232 Such videos may be a powerful source of relevant 
information beyond a single case featuring the parties recorded 
because of the systemic facts that the accumulated data reveals. 
Event replay and video evidence can better inform the work of 
appellate judges as well as magistrate judges and trial judges.233 In 
 
 227 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in 
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016). 
 228 See id. at 2066-68. 
 229 Id. at 2066. For a review of the differences between adjudicative and legislative 
facts, see Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942); Kenneth Culp Davis, 
Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955). 
 230 Crespo, supra note 227, at 2072-75. 
 231 Id. at 2074-85. 
 232 See supra Part I.A., discussing the problems with the primacy of one-
dimensional text. 
 233 In the federal system, magistrate judges have the power to make proposed 
findings of fact and recommendations to district court judges. United States v. 
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appeals of search and seizure suppression matters, appellate courts 
review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error.234 Mixed 
questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.235 While appellate 
courts are typically viewed as confined to paper records, reviewing 
video files gives appellate courts the full basis to assess whether factual 
findings below were clearly erroneous and to review mixed questions 
of fact and law de novo.236 Video reviewed and admitted below should 
be as much a part of the relevant record on appeal as traditional paper 
transcripts of testimony.237 
Yet practices regarding viewing video — or even whether the record 
on review even includes video — vary among courts.238 Some courts 
have explicitly held that video evidence admitted in the trial courts is a 
necessary part of the record on appeal.239 Remarkably, however, some 
appellate courts still do not even get the video as part of the record 
transmitted on appeal, even though the parties showed the video in 
the suppression hearing below.240 And even if they receive the video in 
the record on appeal, some appellate judges refuse to view them in 
 
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1980). These proposed findings and recommendations 
are given “such weight as [their] merit commands and the sound discretion of the 
judge warrants.” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976)). 
 234 E.g., United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1136 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 235 French, 291 F.3d at 950-51; Williamson, 1 F.3d at 1136. 
 236 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining 
that courts reviewing a motion to suppress based on live testimony accept the trial 
court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous). 
 237 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 68 F.3d 1242, 1243 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that the entire contested police encounter was recorded on video with audio 
and this tape was admitted into evidence and designated as part of the record on 
appeal and that “[a]ll facts recited [in the opinion’s statement of the facts] that are not 
accompanied by a record cite have been taken from the video-audio recording”). 
 238 See, e.g., State v. Reid, 722 S.E.2d 364, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“The stop was 
recorded on video, and the video was shown to the court below at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, but no copy of the video appears in the record on appeal.”); 
Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 366 (Ind. 2014) (“We consider video evidence 
admitted in the trial court to be a necessary part of the record on appeal, just like any 
other type of evidence.”); State v. Lyon, 862 N.W.2d 391, 393 n.1 (Iowa 2015) 
(viewing dash camera footage on appeal and finding it inconclusive on the issues); 
State v. Rascon, No. 30,561, 2011 WL 704472 at *2 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2011) 
(refusing to view video on appeal).  
 239 E.g., Robinson, 5 N.E.3d, at 366. 
 240 See, e.g., Reid, 722 S.E.2d, at 365 n.2 (noting the absence of the video even 
though the parties discuss the video and the video was viewed by the trial court).  
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reviewing suppression questions though the judge admitted the video 
below.241 
Part of the reason for varying practices is confusion over whether 
the very act of viewing the video constitutes a reweighing of the 
evidence.242 The position is puzzling. Appellate judges still have a duty 
to determine if the factual findings were clearly erroneous if 
defendants contest the suppression hearing findings on appeal.243 
Moreover, on mixed questions of law and fact, appellate judges have 
the duty of reviewing the suppression issue de novo.244 Why should 
judges blind themselves to an important part of the record in carrying 
out their duty of review? It is similar to reviewing whether the 
testimony and other evidence adduced at the suppression hearing 
directly contradicts the trial court’s findings, rendering them clearly 
erroneous. The fear of the audiovisual record seems to reflect the 
traditional association of text with rationality and the fallacy that 
“thinking in words is the only kind of thinking there is.”245 Traditional 
text-bound courts are puzzled about how to incorporate the explosion 
of images that technology permits.246 
Another reason for variations in whether appellate courts review 
video introduced below is simply mechanical — the video may not 
have been transmitted in the record on appeal with the paper file.247 
Where the video is missing from the record, it should be 
supplemented sua sponte even if the parties fail to request 
supplementation.248 In a time of transition from traditional paper 
 
 241 See, e.g., Rascon, 2011 WL 704472, at *2 (refusing to view video on appeal).  
 242 For a discussion see, for example, Robinson, 5 N.E.3d, at 365-67. 
 243 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that 
determinations of whether there was probable cause or reasonable articulable 
suspicion for a search or seizure should be reviewed de novo while findings of 
historical fact are reviewed for clear error); Frazier v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.3d 
448, 452 (Ky. 2013) (“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion, an 
appellate court must first determine if the trial court’s factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous and are supported by substantial evidence. . . . A de novo review of the trial 
court’s application of the law to the facts completes the analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
 244 E.g., United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1136 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 245 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 41, at 4. 
 246 See Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 
1691-92, 1715-16 (2014) (discussing how textbound courts are lagging behind the 
proliferation of images). 
 247 See, e.g., State v. Reid, 722 S.E.2d 364, 365 n.2 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (noting “no 
copy of the video appears in the record on appeal” though it was viewed at the 
suppression hearing and is argued by the defendant in his brief). 
 248 Cf. id. (“No one has asked us to order the supplementation of the record, and 
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records to multimedia records, it is important for courts to take the 
lead even if the parties are uncertain or confused to ensure that the 
appellate record is complete. 
Trial and appellate judges also have an important role to play in 
protecting against selective recording. In jurisdictions that require 
recording, where video is missing or part of an event is unrecorded, 
judges should inquire into the reasons for the gaps and omissions. The 
unavailability of video evidence despite departmental policy requiring 
recording is relevant in drawing inferences on disputed questions of 
fact. Drawing inferences based on omissions is a practice elsewhere in 
the law. For example, in the context of toxic tort and environmental 
litigation, spoliation of evidence — the failure to preserve evidence 
potentially favorable to an adversary in reasonably foreseeable 
litigation — can be the basis of adverse inferences.249 Regular judicial 
inquiry into gaps and omissions can help deter selective recording. 
Such selective recording defeats the purpose of transitioning to body 
cameras in promoting public trust and greater transparency and 
reliability of evidence. Anticipation of regular judicial inquiry gives 
departments a nudge to realize the full potential of the benefits of 
body camera evidence. 
Judicial nudges should not become penalty sticks that deter police 
departments from transitioning to body cameras, however. Despite the 
spreading of body cameras in departments across the nation, some 
police chiefs are adopting a wait and see approach, concerned about 
suffering the slings and arrows of technological malfunctions. As one 
chief put it: 
This reminds me of a similar effort to get cameras into police 
cars in the mid 1990’s. The technology of the time, usually a 
consumer-grade camera recording to 8mm tape, was really not 
up to the task, and many departments plunged headlong into 
video systems only to find that they had inadvertently created 
their own nightmare. They didn’t plan for such things as the 
cost and logistics of storing and retrieving video, training, 
tagging evidentiary clips, installing, maintaining, and replacing 
equipment. 
 
under the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to do so sua 
sponte. . . . [I]t is not the responsibility of this Court to ensure that the appellate 
record is complete.”).  
 249 E.g., Enstrom v. Garden Place Hotel, 811 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264-65 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2006); Roberta R. Wilson & James O’Toole, Jr., Spoliation Concerns in Enviro, Toxic 
Tort Litigation, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
77528/spoliation-concerns-in-enviro-toxic-tort-litigation. 
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By the end of the decade, you could commonly read news 
stories about departments where half of the cameras were out 
of service at any given time, or the department was scrambling 
to find money to replace broken and outdated equipment. The 
problem abated as some departments scaled back their 
installations to a manageable number, and as the technology 
improved. Today, digital in-car camera systems are a much 
more mature technology, and though expensive, we’ve learned 
the lessons of the 1990s on how to make such a program 
work. I’m glad in hindsight that we didn’t dive into the water 
too early in Lincoln, and waited until the technology 
improved.250 
Technology is fallible. The technology is also new and takes time to 
master. For now, the training wheels are on and judicial inquiry into 
omissions and gaps should reflect sensitivity to this transition phase. 
Inquiry can be a nudge but a penalty for omissions can be a cudgel to 
deter uptake of body cameras and policies that require recording of a 
broader swathe of enforcement activities. 
B. The Judicial Role in Reducing Privacy Harms 
While potentially beneficial, body-worn cameras also represent the 
multiplication of pervasive surveillance devices on the streets and even 
in homes when people call for help or officers execute warrants.251 
Good reasons may exist to turn off the camera to protect privacy or 
victims and witnesses — particularly because public disclosure laws in 
some states may subject recordings to release.252 The privacy arm of 
this study found substantial variation on when cameras should be 
turned off to protect privacy.253 While provisions requiring camera 
shut-off in restrooms, hospitals, and with informants are prevalent, 
there is much less consensus on sensitive contexts such as recording 
of minors, witnesses, and victims, including sexual assault or domestic 
violence victims.254 
 
 250 Casady, supra note 29. 
 251 Cf. Suggested Guidelines on Use of Body Cameras by Police, ACLU (Sept. 8, 2014, 
8:40 AM), http://www.aclu-il.org/statement-regarding-use-of-body-cameras-by-police/ 
(discussing the need for privacy-protective policies that prevent “the use of body cams 
from becoming another broad surveillance tool”).  
 252 Fan, Police Body Cameras, supra note 20, at 397-404, 411-12. 
 253 The results are reported, and the tension between privacy and public disclosure 
laws is analyzed, in id. at 426-30. 
 254 Id. at 428-29. 
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In the absence of consensus or even explicit guidance, officer 
discretion may be the only safeguard for victims, witnesses and minors 
having their most painful moments posted on Youtube.255 Judicial 
inquiry into gaps and omissions in recording should thus be sensitive 
to this reality. Officers should not be deterred from protecting minors 
or victims of painful or intimate crimes by the risk of censure in court. 
The lack of recording should be acceptable to courts where officers 
have a reasonable articulable privacy reason for why the camera was 
shut off. 
Courts already have experience applying the reasonable articulable 
basis standard in the context of reviewing Terry stops and cursory 
searches for officer safety.256 The standard is lower than probable 
cause because of the protective and preventative nature of the 
power.257 In the case of justified non-recording, the protective purpose 
is the privacy of victims and witnesses rather than officer safety. The 
requirement of an objective basis beyond a conclusory assertion but 
one that is not so high as to chill protective efforts is similarly useful 
in this context. 
Courts can also supplement gaps in law, policy and discretion when 
vulnerable victims and embarrassing moments are caught on camera. 
Judges may order redaction of addresses and people’s faces so that they 
are not readily identifiable.258 Courts also have the power to seal 
evidence from general public disclosure and prohibit the parties from 
disseminating privacy-intrusive recordings released for purposes of 
judicial proceedings.259 
 
 255 Id. at 397-404, 411-12. 
 256 See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“In Terry, we held that 
an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory 
stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot. While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause 
and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, . . . [we 
require] at least a minimal level of objective justification . . . .”). 
 257 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 329, 332-36 (1990). 
 258 See, e.g., Showing Animals Respect & Kindness v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 730 
F. Supp. 2d 180, 196-97 (D.D.C. 2010) (ordering redactions of video to protect 
privacy); Cape Publ’ns v. City of Louisville, 147 S.W.3d 731, 732-35 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2003) (holding that sexual assault victim information could be redacted from police 
reports to protect privacy); State v. Densmore, 624 A.2d 1138, 1144 (Vt. 1993) 
(noting that the privacy interests of victims may justify redactions). 
 259 See, e.g., In re N.Y. Times Co., 834 F.2d 1152, 1154 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that 
sealing or redaction may be warranted to protect privacy); Dampman v. Morgenthau, 
599 N.Y.S.2d 390, 398-99 (N.Y. App. Term 1993) (noting that courts may seal records 
to protect the privacy of victims, witnesses, and the defendant). 
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C. Rules of Judicial Restraint for Multimedia Interpretation 
The replay power coming to courts, while bigger and better than 
ever before, has important limitations. Replay via body camera footage 
is not like instant replay in sports.260 Modern-day instant replay in 
sports relies on several camera angles mounted on stable positions to 
optimize clarity and viewing vantage.261 In contrast, body cameras are 
mounted on officers in motion.262 The camera catches a single 
perspective at an angle.263 The vantage point from an officer’s head or 
chest is much better than previously available via dash camera but that 
does not mean it is capable of catching the full truth, or even the 
relevant truth.264 Thus while body camera footage should be regularly 
consulted, it should be consulted with care and understanding about 
the limits of video evidence. 
1. Objectivity, Subjectivity and the Camera Eye 
Camera footage is often portrayed as better than human accounts at 
capturing the objective truth. The oft-expressed hope for body 
cameras is to “provide an unbiased audio and video recording of 
events that officers encounter.”265 Images seem to represent a direct 
window into reality unsullied by human manipulation or 
misperception of the truth.266 Images have the power to persuade by 
suggesting a transparent depiction of reality without discernible resort 
to rhetoric. 267 The seductive power of images obscures the fact that 
the meaning one derives is structured by camera framing, and by one’s 
 
 260 See, e.g., History of Instant Replay, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, 
http://operations.nfl.com/the-game/history-of-instant-replay/ (last visited Feb. 20, 
2016), (offering history of the evolution of instant replay to the sophisticated system 
today). 
 261 Id. 
 262 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 6 (describing body-worn camera 
resolution specifications and mounting considerations to capture data). 
 263 See id. 
 264 See, e.g., DALL. POLICE DEP’T, GEN. ORDER 3XX.00 BODY WORN CAMERAS 1 (“The 
department recognizes that BWC images have a limited field of view and cannot 
always show the full story, nor do video images capture an entire scene.”). 
 265 PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21 (2015); see also, e.g., AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, 
POLICY MANUAL, POLICY 303, at 132 (2015) (“The use of Body Worn Digital Recording 
(BWDR) system provides an unbiased audio/video recording of events that employees 
encounter.”).  
 266 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 41, at 8. 
 267 Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 683, 692 (2012). 
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own worldviews and experiences.268 Moreover, the relevant truth may 
not be the camera’s depiction.269 
While the camera seems to be an unbiased eye, camera perspective 
can powerfully shape viewer judgments without the viewer realizing 
this effect.270 The key studies of the impact of camera perspective on 
viewer judgment in the criminal procedure context come from studies 
of videotaped interrogations.271 Psychologists found that pointing the 
camera so that the viewer is directly facing the suspect makes the 
viewer more likely to believe the suspect voluntarily made the 
statements during interrogation.272 This subtle shaping of decision 
making by camera perspective arises because of a phenomenon called 
illusory causation.273 People attribute more causal influence over an 
exchange to the person they are facing simply because that person is 
more salient, a cognitive bias also dubbed the salience effect.274 
Professional expertise apparently does not defuse the power of 
camera perspective.275 Judges and law enforcement officers are also 
susceptible to the camera perspective effect.276 Viewers are most likely 
to rate a confession as coerced if the camera is pointing at the detective 
and least likely if the camera is pointed at the suspect.277 Focusing a 
camera on the suspect and detective equally moderates this point-of-
view bias.278 
 
 268 Id. at 689-90; see also Vivian Yee & Kirk Johnson, Body Cameras Worn by Police 
Officers Are No ‘Safeguard of Truth,’ Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2014, at A1 
(discussing divergent interpretations of video). 
 269 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 270 G. Daniel Lassiter, Shari Seidman Diamond, Heather C. Schmidt & Jennifer K. 
Elek, Evaluating Videotaped Confessions: Expertise Provides No Defense Against the 
Camera-Perspective Effect, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 224-25 (2007) [hereinafter Evaluating 
Videotaped Confessions]; G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Further Evidence of a Robust Point-of-
View Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 21 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 265, 267 (2002) 
[hereinafter Further Evidence]; see G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Attributional Complexity 
and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 27 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 27, 28-29 (2005) [hereinafter Attributional Complexity]. 
 271 Lassiter et al., Further Evidence, supra note 270, at 266-84; see Lassiter et al., 
Attributional Complexity, supra note 270, at 28-29; Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped 
Confessions, supra note 270, at 224. 
 272 Lassiter et al., Attributional Complexity, supra note 270, at 28. 
 273 Id. at 27-28. 
 274 Id.; Lassiter et al., Further Evidence, supra note 270, at 267. 
 275 Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions, supra note 270, at 225. 
 276 Id. at 224-25. 
 277 Lassiter et al., Further Evidence, supra note 270, at 268-69. 
 278 Id. at 269; see Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions, supra note 270, 
at 224-25.  
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The impact of body camera perspective remains to be studied. We 
can draw some insights from cinematic theory as well as the camera 
perspective studies in the interrogation context. Unlike the camera in 
the interrogation context, body cameras are highly mobile rather than 
a fixed stationary perspective trained on the suspect. An important 
feature of body cameras is that it conveys the story from the officer’s 
point of view, especially if the camera is placed at eye level. In 
cinematic storytelling, a point of view shot is created by placing the 
camera lens at the eye level of the character whose point of view we 
are seeing.279 When we watch what is unfolding from a point-of-view 
shot — the officer’s point of view, in the body camera context —we 
get a sense of intimacy from seeing things from his subjective point of 
view.280 This intimacy heightens sympathy for the officer’s perspective 
because we have the sense of seeing through his eyes.281 
Framing is likely to elicit more than just one-sided sympathy, 
however. In a body camera frame, the officer is necessarily 
disembodied, out of frame, except for perhaps a pair of hands 
gesturing, or a knee or leg extending. Often, what is pictured close-up 
is the suspect.282 Close-ups are also a framing technique that elicits 
sympathy.283 The closer up we get, and the longer the close-up, the 
more sympathy is likely to be elicited because of the physical 
proximity associated with intimacy.284 So the close-up focus on 
suspects may elicit sympathy — and likely a lot more sympathy than 
comes from reading a police report about the encounter. On the other 
hand, if the officer is focused on the suspect and pointing the camera 
directly at him, then this perspective may trigger the illusory causation 
effect that renders the viewer less likely to find the exchange 
involuntary.285 
When we listen to testimony or read affidavits or reports, we take 
into consideration the source and make credibility assessments and 
discounts for partiality.286 While our “common-sense” readings of 
 
 279 JENNIFER VAN SIJLL, CINEMATIC STORYTELLING 156 (Paul Norlen ed., 2005). 
 280 See id. (“POV shots give audiences an exaggerated sense of intimacy with the 
character.”). 
 281 See id. at 156, 170 (“The POV shot generally lends sympathy to the protagonist 
by allowing us to see through the character’s eyes.”). 
 282 For examples, see the stills, supra notes 58–59. 
 283 VAN SIJLL, supra note 279, at 148. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Lassiter et al., Attributional Complexity, supra note 270, at 28; Lassiter et al., 
Evaluating Videotaped Confessions, supra note 270, at 224; Lassiter et al., Further 
Evidence, supra note 270, at 268-69. 
 286 Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 
  
950 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:897 
witness credibility may be skewed by factors such as the witness 
appearance, we are at least making judgments about the source’s 
motives to present facts in a particular light.287 The persuasion by 
camera perspective is not as readily understandable or known, 
however. As the audiovisual record becomes a regular part of review, 
fact-finders need to become more adept at understanding and 
interpreting images as portrayals and discerning persuasion effects. 
2. The Proper Perceptual Yardsticks and Fact-Finders 
Cameras may also tempt us to ignore the relevant standard on legal 
questions where the proper yardstick should be what each person 
perceived, not what a mounted machine can capture. Criminal 
procedure standards often are based on human perceptions or what 
the officer knew at the time of the event.288 For example the legal 
standard for whether officers are engaging in interrogation or its 
functional equivalent examines “the perceptions of the suspect” as 
well as the officers’ conduct.289 Whether the officer had probable cause 
to arrest a suspect is based on “the facts known to the arresting officer 
at the time of the arrest.”290 Whether there was reasonable articulable 
suspicion for a stop is also examined in light of the facts known to the 
officer at the time.291 Whether there is a reasonable basis for a safety 
search of a vehicle is also based on the facts known to the officer at the 
time.292 And whether use of force is reasonable is also judged from the 
perspective of the reasonable officer at the scene, knowing what the 
officer knew at the time.293 
Body-worn cameras may capture only part of what officers and 
suspects see — or more than the parties can perceive, especially in 
 
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 174-77 (1990).  
 287 See, e.g., Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1078-82 
(1991) (discussing perceptual frailties in evaluating demeanor). 
 288 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700-01 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“As the Court recognizes, determinations of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion involve a two-step process. First, a court must identify all of the 
relevant historical facts known to the officer at the time of the stop or search; and 
second, it must decide whether, under a standard of objective reasonableness, those 
facts would give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop or probable cause to 
search.”). 
 289 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
 290 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2004). 
 291 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 
(1968). 
 292 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 n.11 (1983).  
 293 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  
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stressful law enforcement situations. The San Diego Police 
Department’s policy provides an important caution applicable to 
courts as well as officers: 
Video cannot always show the full story nor does it capture an 
entire scene. . . . Persons reviewing recordings must also be 
cautious before conclusions are reached about what the video 
shows. . . . 
BWCs [body-worn cameras] have a field of vision of either 75 
degrees for the Flex or 130 degrees for the Axon. While 
human beings have a field of vision of 180 degrees, the human 
brain has a field of attention of 50-60 degrees. Under stress, 
this field can narrow down to a ½ degree. Stress also induces 
auditory exclusion and prevents the brain from analyzing and 
remembering all the stimuli that it takes in through the senses. 
Officers make decisions based on the totality of the human 
senses. An officer’s recollection of specific details may be 
different than what is captured in digital evidence since BWCs 
only capture audio and video. 294 
If video is elevated as the objective truth — and officers are 
regularly encouraged or even required to view the video before writing 
reports — then there is intense pressure to conform memory and 
accounts to the video even when human perceptions may have been 
different than what was recorded.295 Courts as well as officers need to 
understand why good-faith testimony may diverge from camera 
recording and avoid pressures to force-fit human recollections into a 
machine recording. Moreover, where the appropriate yardstick are the 
knowledge and the perceptions of persons at the time of the event, the 
temptation to privilege what is captured on video as the higher truth 
must be resisted. 
Another important issue in determining the relevant truth is the 
appropriate fact-finder, which differs depending on the procedural 
posture of the case and the type of criminal procedure issue raised. On 
factual questions properly reserved for a jury, such as matters that go 
 
 294 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP’T PROCEDURE NO. 1.49 1, 11 (2015). 
 295 See, e.g., DIR. T. ARMSTRONG, MEMPHIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
INFORMATION AND UPDATES, SERIAL 12-15 § IV.F (2015) (requiring that officers review 
body-worn camera footage before writing reports);CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 294, 
at 11 (requiring that officers review digital evidence before completing reports to 
prime their recollection but “shall not write their reports based solely on what they 
viewed from the BWC recording”). 
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to guilt, innocence or liability, judicial restraint is required to resist 
substituting the interpretations of judges for the interpretation of 
juries.296 What might seem to obviously meet a standard to one viewer 
may be interpreted differently by another because image interpretation 
is filtered through the worldview and experiences of the perceiver.297 
The distinction between video interpretation properly reserved for 
the courts versus the jury is raised by the Supreme Court’s reliance on 
dash camera video in Scott v. Harris.298 The plaintiff in the case sued 
the police after he crashed and became a quadriplegic when police 
tried to halt his high-speed flight by executing a maneuver that causes 
cars to spin to a stop.299 The district court denied the officers’ motion 
for summary judgment and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on 
interlocutory appeal, ruling that there was a sufficient basis to proceed 
to trial on whether the force used by police was reasonable.300 
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court disagreed with both lower 
courts.301 The Court ruled that no reasonable juror could agree with 
the plaintiff’s account that the police used excessive force to stop him 
during a high-speed vehicle pursuit captured on dash camera.302 The 
dash camera videos of the chase played a crucial role in the Supreme 
Court’s decision.303 Scholars expressed concern that an appellate court 
was usurping the role of jurors in interpreting facts portrayed by 
images subject to divergent interpretations.304 
Many of the factual disputes in criminal procedure cases are 
resolved by judges rather than juries, however, because the 
exclusionary rule remains the central remedy to enforce constitutional 
criminal procedure protections.305 Determining whether evidence is 
 
 296 See, e.g., United States v. Pope, 613 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The 
jury is, of course, charged with determining the general issue of a defendant’s guilt or 
innocence. Fact-finding by the district court based on evidence that goes to this 
question can risk trespassing on territory reserved to the jury as the ultimate finder of 
fact in our criminal justice system.”). 
 297 Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 840-47, 865-80. 
 298 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 74 
(“[I]t is deeply troubling when an appellate court, acting on its own, watches a tape 
and decides the facts of a case for itself.”); Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 841-42 
(arguing the Court was wrong to privilege its own view of the video and deny jurors 
the opportunity to interpret it based on their worldviews). 
 299 Scott, 550 U.S. at 375-76. 
 300 Id. at 376. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. at 386. 
 303 See id. at 378-79. 
 304 E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 74; Kahan et al., supra note 31, at 841-42. 
 305 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (noting “the obvious futility 
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admissible is the province of judges.306 In evaluating admissibility, 
including whether the exclusionary remedy applies, judges play the 
key role in resolving disputed questions of fact central to determining 
whether constitutional rights were violated.307 On such questions, trial 
and appellate judges should be able to replay contested events 
captured on video and interpret their legal significance to improve the 
accuracy of justice and lift the traditional blinders. 
CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL CULTIVATION AND UPTAKE 
Much of the current focus is on how body cameras will play in the 
court of public opinion to rebuild public trust and demonstrate police 
accountability.308 Yet there is another crucial audience for body 
camera video footage — the courts that forge criminal procedure law, 
the primary rules governing police.309 The hundreds of thousands of 
hours of video footage coming to courts from the body camera 
revolution have the potential to transform the traditional reliance on 
testimony and text in adjudicating the search and seizure disputes that 
shape the course of criminal procedure law.310 
Salient stories and dramatic events, such as officer-involved 
shootings or alleged body cavity searches at the roadside, tend to seize 
public attention.311 Yet most of the hundreds of thousands of hours of 
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video footage that police departments across the nation will generate 
are of everyday law enforcement activities such as initiating 
consensual encounters, stops, and patdowns, often in response to calls 
for service from the community.312 These everyday searches and 
seizures are the main staples of criminal procedure and the criminal 
justice system and are of great importance to courts. 
Consider the still below from body camera video.313 The camera 
footage is from a consensual encounter.314 The officers received three 
calls for service, each reporting what the caller believes to be a 
suspicious-looking man, possibly intoxicated, on the sidewalk in front 
of a service center for women and children.315 The callers indicated 
they saw the man put his hand inside his pants, then remove the 
hand.316 Is the man lawfully hanging out on a public street and 
scratching his groin? Or is there some potential criminality or danger? 
To investigate, the officers approach the man and ask a series of 
questions about where he is going, where he has been and why he 
happens to be on that street corner, to confirm or dispel whether there 
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The video of this consensual encounter is not as dramatic as those 
that tend to get the most airplay in the court of public opinion. Yet 
such video footage is crucial to the work of courts adjudicating 
common questions such as whether officer had reasonable articulable 
suspicion for stop and frisk318 or probable cause for an arrest319 and 
thus a proper basis for a search incident to arrest.320 One of the goals 
of this article’s coding and analysis of body camera policies in police 
departments serving the 100 largest cities is to show this major 
paradigm shift in the evidence available to courts in body camera 
jurisdictions.321 
The body camera revolution is thus also potentially revolutionary 
for courts, relieving the traditional reliability on testimony — often 
just from one side — to reconstruct events.322 When the defendant 
disputes the account of what happened in officer reports and 
testimony, the court has another source of information besides deeply 
divergent stories and ugly credibility contests that leave neither officer 
 
 318 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-
22 (1968). 
 319 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-23 (1976).  
 320 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228-35 (1973).  
 321 See discussion supra Part II. 
 322 See discussion supra Section I.A.1. 
Body camera footage of officers responding to calls for service about 
a suspicious person and engaging in a consensual encounter. 
  
956 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:897 
nor defendant unscathed.323 Video offers a check on the fallibility of 
human perception, giving adjudicators the ability to replay events and 
perceive them free of the passions and partisanship of being one of the 
adversarial parties.324 
Courts have an important role to play in cultivating the spread of 
body cameras and the normalization of the audiovisual record in 
adjudicating search and seizure suppression motions.325 In 
jurisdictions with mandatory body camera recording policies, body 
camera video should be an important source of information for judges 
in finding the facts and deciding suppression motions.326 The 
increasing utilization of video viewing can reduce the need to sort 
through wildly divergent accounts because the parties are constrained 
in what they can claim by the audiovisual record.327 Where recording 
is required but the disputed enforcement event is unrecorded, courts 
should inquire into the reason why.328 Judicial nudges should not be 
cudgels to deter voluntary police department uptake of body cameras, 
however. Technology is fallible.329 Cameras may fail or risk violating 
the privacy or safety of victims and witnesses.330 Courts should accept 
reasonable explanations without penalty lest other departments 
considering adopting body cameras be deterred from voluntarily 
undertaking reform. 
Finally, rules of judicial restraint are also needed as body camera 
video replay becomes a regular part of judicial review. The power to 
replay events is an important evidentiary advance but it also has 
pitfalls.331 While there is a tendency to privilege the video as revealing 
the truth impartially, what a camera can capture may not always be 
the relevant truth, nor convey one story free of framing effects and the 
subjectivity of viewer perception.332 In criminal procedure, people are 
judged by what was reasonable and known to them at the time, in the 
heat and stress of the moment, rather than all that a machine can 
dispassionately capture.333 Just as one reads testimony and considers 
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the perspective of the perceiver and the proper fact-finder for resolving 
disputes, one should interpret video and consider the perspective from 
which it is mounted and the proper fact-finder for resolving 
interpretative disputes. The great promise of body camera video 
evidence should be cultivated with care to realize its promise without 
abdicating the proper perceptual yardsticks and judicial restraint. 
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APPENDIX 
Police Departments Serving One of the 100 Largest Cities in the 
United States with Obtainable Body Camera Policies Coded in this 
Study. 
 
1. New York, NY 
2. Los Angeles, CA 
3. Chicago, IL 
4. Houston, TX 
5. Philadelphia, PA 
6. Phoenix, AZ 
7. San Diego, CA 
8. Dallas, TX 
9. San Jose, CA 
10. Austin, TX 
11. San Francisco, CA 
12. Fort Worth, TX 
13. Charlotte, NC 
14. Memphis, TN 
15. Seattle, WA 
16. Denver, CO 
17. Washington, DC 
18. Baltimore, MD 
19. Louisville, KY 
20. Portland, OR (no departmental policy at the time of coding, but 
we coded Oregon legislation) 
21. Milwaukee, WI 
22. Las Vegas, NV 
23. Albuquerque, NM 
24. Tucson, AZ 
25. Fresno, CA 
26. Atlanta, GA 
27. Miami, FL 
28. Oakland, CA 
29. Cleveland, OH 
30. Wichita, KS 
31. New Orleans, LA 
32. Anaheim, CA 
33. Corpus Christi, TX (no departmental policy at the time of 
coding, but we coded Texas legislation) 
34. Greensboro, NC 
35. Chula Vista, CA 
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36. Norfolk, VA 
37. Chandler, AZ 
38. Durham, NC 
39. Winston-Salem, NC 
40. Chesapeake, VA 
41. Scottsdale, AZ 
42. Fremont, CA 
43. Gilbert, AZ 
